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 2
Writing a master’s thesis, or any academic work for that matter, is a daunting 
task. It is a necessarily rigorous, demanding mental effort that spans months of one’s life. 
With over a dozen years of experience as a journalist, I felt prepared for the researching 
and writing component of such a project. But appropriately, the main challenge I have 
faced is to think what I am doing, as per Hannah Arendt‘s demand of people in the 
Human Condition.1 To be more specific, while the academic writing process inherently 
demands of one to think what they are doing, I have repeatedly faced a roadblock that is a 
remnant of my professional experience. This roadblock occurs as I shift from the 
practice-oriented world of journalism to theory-based- academia. As I have perceived it, 
this difficulty represents a conflict (or at least different categories of thought) between 
thought and action; theory and practice; between ideals and reality. 
 These conflicts are also evident in the political realm of human affairs, In this 
thesis, I will explore the natural tension that exists between philosophy and politics; 
theory and practice, and thought and action, especially as manifest in contemporary 
society. In order to investigate this tension, I will use a lens presented by Hannah Arendt 
and her writings, in particular the Human Condition and the Jewish Writings2. I will use 
these works to illustrate Arendt’s own conflict between the role of politics and 
philosophy in human affairs as experienced in her transition from a political journalist to 
a political theorist. I will argue that a comparison of these works shows Arendt’s struggle 
with the tension between philosophy and politics; thought and action, and theory and 
practice. A comparison of these works also illustrates Arendt’s paradoxical conclusion of 
the Human Condition: that in times of unprecedented crisis, although theory and 
                                                          
1
 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. 
2
 Hannah Arendt. The Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken Books, 2007. 
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philosophy are precisely what are necessary to prevent further destruction and tragedy, 
they unfortunately become superfluous, and then immediate (even if groundless) action 
becomes necessarily the only human capacity that can “save” the world. 
 This contention will be fleshed out by examining the contrasts, similarities and 
apparent contradictions between Arendt’s statements in the Jewish Writings and the 
Human Condition. In studying these two very different works, I argue that Arendt’s 
progression of thought illustrates the paradox of human political relations: that theory and 
philosophy can be dangerous, dehumanizing elements that can degrade spontaneous 
action, yet they become absolutely necessary in modern politics to save humanity from 
descending into barbarism. In particular, I will address Arendt’s turn to philosophy as 
exhibited by her concept of natality as that which can save us from ourselves by allowing 
us to forever begin anew with thoughtful action. 
 This thesis will proceed first with a brief prologue outlining my own experiences 
and reflections on politics and philosophy that were formed during my time as a political 
journalist and writer. Then, a review of the relevant literature will be provided, with a 
focus on natality and Arendt’s political philosophy as it appears in the Human Condition. 
A synopsis of the Jewish Writings will follow in order to illustrate Arendt’s career as a 
political journalist, which includes the observations and philosophical musings that lead 
to her turn to political philosophy in the Human Condition. The next component will then 
be a synopsis of this political philosophy as it appears in the Human Condition. I 
conclude by analyzing the significance of Arendt’s transition from a political journalist to 
a political philosopher. 
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MY TURN FROM POLITICAL JOURNALISM TO THEORY 
 As a journalist, I observed and analyzed people in action, practicing politics. 
Thoughtful action, unfortunately, appeared to be relegated by politicians to a second-tier 
luxury activity.  As a student of political philosophy, I would characterize this as a retreat 
from reality to the ivory tower, in which politics is theoretical and practice, or action, is 
secondary.  
 A parallel to political action in my own profession is evident, since as a journalist, 
I learned an action-based skill set aimed at detecting and reporting news. The fast pace 
and insistence on simplicity discouraged any sort of theoretical questioning of journalism 
or political matters. As a result, I entered the workforce well-trained to provide a service, 
however, I lacked the tools necessary to pursue questions that relate to politics, such as 
justice, fortune and authority. So with this background, I reported on politics and business 
for over a decade at a relatively superficial level. I also spent a short time as a political 
writer for a federal party during a Canadian election, during which I wrote rhetorical and 
promotional material.  
 As a journalist, business and politics were my “beats,” but I quickly concluded 
that these categorical names are merely an inconsequential attempt to civilize what are, 
more often than not, uncivilized behaviors amongst people vying for power. To further 
compound what quickly became apparent to me (the pervasive and dissatisfying lack of 
thinking) my method of political reporting was practice-based and did not require much 
theoretical knowledge. Despite, or perhaps because of, the dearth of thinking, theoretical 
questions began to present themselves in my mind, and I began to write longer, analytical 
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pieces to this effect. For the most part, these types of pieces are generally not suitable for 
most newspapers, where space is at a premium. I was encouraged to keep producing 
shorter, factual stories. The questions I had been raising during editorial meetings in 
which we discussed story ideas, and in interviews with politicians, were not being 
addressed. Perhaps it was a function of time (journalistic deadlines), or perhaps a lack of 
interest amongst a pragmatic group of people constantly trying to douse political fires 
(politicians). Whatever the reason, I became frustrated and disillusioned. 
 As a result, I concluded that, despite my preconceived, idealistic hopes to the 
contrary, reporting on the activities of businesspeople and politicians required no more 
depth of thought than covering a police beat or the activities of regular, everyday people. 
In my mind, then, of more importance than the categories we create to understand human 
interaction (politics or business), are the ways we interact with one another, and how we 
forge ahead in a confusing and chaotic world. Despite this conclusion, the modern 
paradigm about politicians and businesspeople is that they operate with virtuous 
principles they have assembled after much thought and education. Unfortunately, I 
concluded this to be untrue, at least if I judge by the criteria of actions and conversations. 
 In addition to this conclusion, as a young, inexperienced and idealistic journalist, I 
quickly learned some other fundamental truths about human nature. These truths became 
apparent in contrast to my preconceived notions of politicians as powerful, idealistic and 
optimistic individuals seeking to achieve a set of goals. As for businesspeople, I 
concluded that political ideals are interchangeable with the drive to succeed and the 
consequence of accumulated wealth. Thus, after more than a decade reporting on politics 
and business, there are several things I observed as consistent human behavior. While not 
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groundbreaking, my observations are relevant in terms of my return to academia. These 
rudimentary “truths” about human beings engaged in political action are as follows: First: 
most people begin with intentions that could be considered honorable or good, at least in 
regards to trying to improve the human condition. Their aims rarely consist of a naked 
power grab, as one might think, but the power and influence become ends in themselves, 
rather than means. Second: obtaining and retaining political or financial power requires 
people to compromise themselves and the ideals they might strive for. The constitution of 
each individual dictates how much they are willing to compromise. Third: and this is 
where my mental roadblock finds its source, people engaged in political activity rarely 
show any signs of having preceded action with deep thought.  
 There were very few instances in which politicians overtly exhibited any trace of 
substantial political thought or theoretical questioning. There are several easily 
identifiable explanations, at first glance. This phenomenon is explainable in part by the 
outsider status to which reporters are relegated. Reporters are rarely, if ever, granted 
access to the halls in which the inner-workings of politicians and their parties occur. And 
it should also be granted that most, if not all, political parties and individual politicians 
have some semblance of a manifesto or an ideal they hold in their mind. But despite these 
potential explanations for the lack of thought I witnessed, more often than not, when I 
interviewed politicians, whether individually or in a “scrum”, they immediately resorted 
to language that was rhetorical, superficial, pre-approved, cliché-ridden, or the 
maddeningly empty language of a bureaucrat.  
 While one can definitely state that this is due to the confrontational and distrustful 
nature of the relationship between journalist and politician, I observed their empty 
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language everywhere, not just in conversation with reporters. This has led me to suspect 
that in the reality of the daily turnings of political machinery, theorizing or striving for 
ideals is a time-consuming luxury. In order to avoid complete cynicism, I would prefer to 
think that this idealistic, theoretical stage of forming one’s political position occurs long 
before one enters the arena and realizesa the necessity of pragmatism. Perhaps this is why 
theorizing is mainly restricted to production by think tanks and academia, after which it is 
disseminated, refined and distilled for popular consumption.  
 If a politician does hold theoretical ideals, these ideals are almost inherently 
relegated to secondary status in terms of guiding their actions. This is because in order to 
practice politics, one must first be elected to office. To do this successfully, (in a 
Western, democratic society) a politician must please a majority of a plurality of people. 
Thus, any ideals one sets for oneself likely become watered down, pastel versions of the 
colorful ideals originally presented to the electorate. Alternatively, a politician then 
becomes bogged down in the sodden weeds of serving constituents. In reality, this 
politician finds that their actions must be instinctual and survival-oriented, as opposed to 
actions taken after slow, patient consideration as to whether or not they correspond with 
one’s theoretical ideal. So in order to please constituents and keep their job, the actions of 
a politician must be focused on the minutia of a transportation bill, or he or she must 
compromise an ideal to help a local businessman secure a building permit and thus secure 
another vote. Consideration and discussion of fundamental ideas or “big picture” projects 
then are no longer a priority. 
 This admittedly cynical point of view was shaped not only when I was a 
journalist, but when I wrote for clients who ranged from political parties to 
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businesspeople wishing to market a new strategy or product. My time as a political writer 
was during a federal election. The election period in Canada is, by law, restricted to 
roughly one month. This creates an extremely fast-paced, urgent environment. Needless 
to say, as a writer, I was called upon to create a specific type of product: one that cast the 
politicians and their party in the most flattering and compelling light. An observer might 
call it propaganda. Whatever its name, I was asked to manipulate the truth. 
 As a reporter, who aims at relaying the truth with as little bias as possible, this 
activity was distasteful to me. Many of my tasks involved massaging words to create a 
flattering version of the truth that may or may not have reflected the reality of the 
situation. This prompted major doubt as to the integrity of politicians and the existence of 
any ideals or underlying theories or commitment to truth that guided their practice. 
Needless to say, these experiences had already colored my perception of the world when 
I began my university career as a political theory student. As a result, I began with this 
roadblock already erected: action trumps thought; politics trumped philosophy and 
pragmatism outweighed idealism.   
HUMAN CONDITION AS MIDDLE GROUND 
 My first encounter with Hannah Arendt’s Human Condition, presented to me a 
unique blend, or a middle ground, of these schisms. It is a blend that seems to me to be 
rare amongst both philosophers and politicians. This daring breach of boundaries 
represents what Arendt is perhaps most renowned for: she called on people to think what 
they are doing with a fresh approach that is untainted neither by tradition nor authority. 
Indeed, she famously urged people to not only think what they are doing, but “think 
without banisters.”  
 9
 It is curious that Arendt arrived at this approach given her renouncement of the 
intellectual world in the 1930s3. In addition, Arendt blamed the crisis of the 20th Century 
on the transformation of philosophy to ideology.4 The question, then, is on what grounds 
did she propose a new philosophy of politics? The recently published Jewish Writings 
provides a clue that Arendt’s response to the events of the 20th Century was indeed not 
philosophical. But this contention is suspect given her extensive experiences with some 
of the most influential philosophers of the 20th Century, such as Martin Heidegger and 
Karl Jaspers. Indeed, there is evidence of a political philosophy in the Jewish Writings. 
 The Jewish Writings is a collection of journalistic essays that span the 1930s to 
the 1960s. Stylistically, this book is mainly factual and historically oriented, but Arendt 
managed to incorporate many philosophical musings and political urgings. As a result, 
the Jewish Writings is an exposition of Arendt’s ideals and convictions gleaned from 
decades as an observer and sometime participant in political affairs that related to 
Zionism and the Holocaust. Prior to turning to the Jewish Writings, however, I will 
proceed with a review of the literature on Arendt’s work, in combination with her own 
words in terms of her intentions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
In order to understand Hannah Arendt’s commentary on philosophy and politics, 
many people situate her best known writings- the Human Condition, On Totalitarianism 
                                                          
3
 Hannah Arendt. “The Political Organization of the Jewish People” in Jewish Writings. New York: 
Schocken Book, .2007, 240. 
4
 In the Promise of Politics, in which Arendt exhibits disdain for philosophy as ideology-or at the very 
least, an attempt at literally implementing an ideal. She writes: “No critique can demolish an ideology more 
utterly than its complete enactment. In the fullness of its flowering, the ideology reaches such an apex of 
absurdity that its credibility sinks to nothing. Precisely when it presents itself most purely, untroubled by 
any historical fact or any ideal truth out of which it once emerged, just then the ground crumbles from 
beneath its feet, because it has continued to interpret itself on its own authority alone. (Hannah Arendt. The 
Promise of Politics. New York: Schocken Books, 2005, 227. 
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and Eichmann in Jerusalem- as central. While one would not be mistaken in doing so, a 
consideration of her entire oeuvre is not only necessary, but more enriching. The recent 
release of two books, the Promise of Politics and the Jewish Writings, make a complete 
consideration even more essential. 
 However, even with such a tactic, many Arendtians still remain puzzled as to 
what she was trying to do in her writings. One stream of thought argues that Arendt’s 
personal circumstances provide a valuable clue in that they are served as an indelible 
influence on her point on view. As an exiled German Jewess, Arendt had firsthand 
experience of politics at its worst. It is undeniable that her biographical status influenced 
her point of view and her writings, and while this approach addresses the psychological 
aspect of the manner in which one’ s worldview is shaped, in Arendt’s case it appears 
especially salient. 
POLITICS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY 
 But before addressing Arendt‘s own history and work, it is useful to provide a 
framework that looks beyond individual thinkers. This step back is necessary because 
Arendt was writing during a time of unprecedented events that altered the way people 
regarded politics and human relations. With this in mind, Andreas Kalyvas provides a 
helpful framework in his book Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, which 
compares the theories of Arendt, Carl Schmitt and Max Weber. Kalyvas tackles Arendt’s 
work by first setting the context as that of massive political ruptures in society, such as 
revolutions. Kalyvas argues that this approach can lead to insights that would otherwise 
be unavailable if one is to restrict political studies to “normal” political relations.  
Kalyvas’ theory of the extraordinary relates to democratic politics and the 
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ruptures and subsequent institutional and societal changes. This atmosphere creates 
“democratic new beginnings” which in turn leads to a “moment of legitimacy” and the 
opportunity for the type of “political freedom” Arendt identified that encourages human 
beings to engage in politics.5 
 Kalyvas identifies another type of extraordinary political behavior which can lead 
to a positive outcome: spontaneous and extraneous collective actions, much like those 
Arendt favored (such as the Warsaw Ghetto uprising6). These extraordinary occurrences 
can also open up new forms of political action. In short, Kalyvas’ theory allows an 
alternative means of analyzing political action since it looks beyond quotidian human 
action, which in turn illuminates a broadened spectrum of possibilities. As Kalyvas says, 
“…a systematic theory of the extraordinary could also indicate ways of re-
conceptualizing radical democracy without falling into the trap of a one-dimensional 
model that reduces popular sovereignty to a constant mobilization and permanent 
participation, making it virtually unrealistic under modern conditions.”7  
In order to understand Arendt’s intentions in her approach to politics and 
philosophy, it is perhaps most logical to turn to her own words that appear in a 1953 reply 
to Professor Eric Voegelin’s critique of her work, Origins of Totalitarianism.89 It is worth 
quoting Arendt at length. 
“Thus my first problem was how to write historically about something- 
totalitarianism-which I did not want to conserve but, on the contrary, felt 
engaged to destroy. My way of solving this problem has given rise to the 
                                                          
5Andreas  Kalyvas. Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008 P. 12. 
6
 Arendt, (2007), 215. 
7
 Ibid, 13. 
8
 Hannah Arendt.. “A Reply to Eric Voegelin,” in Essays in Understanding 1930-1954. Ed Jerome Kohn. 
New York: Harcourt Brace & Company. 1994. P. 401-403. 
9
 Hannah Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Meridien Books- World Publisher, 1955, 193. 
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reproach that the book was lacking in unity. What I did- and what I might 
have done anyway because of my previous training and the way of my 
thinking- was to discover the chief elements of totalitarianism and analyze 
them in historical terms, tracing these elements back in history as far as I 
deemed proper and necessary. That is, I did not write a history of 
totalitarianism, but an analysis in terms of history; I did not write a history 
of anti-Semitism or of imperialism, but analyzed the element of Jew-
hatred and the element of expansion insofar as these elements were still 
clearly visible and played a decisive role in the totalitarian phenomenon 
itself. The book, therefore, does not really deal with the “origins” of 
totalitarianism-as its title unfortunately claims-but gives a historical 
account of the elements which crystallized into totalitarianism; this 
account is followed by an analysis of the elemental structure of totalitarian 
movements and domination itself. The elementary structure of 
totalitarianism is the hidden structure of the book, while its more apparent 
unity is provided by certain fundamental concepts which run like red 
threads through the whole.” 
 
 
Thus, we can see that Arendt explicitly deemed herself first a historical analyst in 
discussing the totalitarian regime. She was not approaching the phenomenon as a 
philosopher, nor as a politician, but rather as an analyst, which is arguably a mix of the 
two in that her conclusions aimed at disseminating useful knowledge to future 
generations so as to avoid the repetition of such a situation. As Arendt wrote in an essay 
on Walter Benjamin in Men in Dark Times, the historian is a “pearl-diver.”10 It is the duty 
of the pearl diver to mine history’s tales for information that could be used, not to prevent 
horrible occurrences, but to learn enough to be able to recognize and guard against the 
seeds that could lead to phenomenon such as totalitarianism. We see here her insistence 
upon action bolstered by thought as that which can preserve the human world.  
 However, human action is rife with unpredictability, which can include dangerous 
situations, and Arendt acknowledged this danger in her condemnation of contemporary 
politics as a failure. She stated this unequivocally: “There are no human institutions and 
                                                          
10
 Hannah Arendt. “Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940”, in Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt Brace & 
World, 1955, 193. 
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revolutions, however radical, that can secure human freedom over the long term.”11 In the 
Jewish Writings, Arendt discussed this failure in terms of how the Jewish population was 
treated, and in part blames the political structure that lead to the stateless status of Jews. 
Specifically, Arendt blamed the politics of competing interests within the Jewish state 
itself, which is also contained within the global structure of nations.  
REJECTION OF HUMAN NATURE 
 In another illumination as to her intentions, in addition to a stringent commitment 
to history as teacher, Arendt did not want to define herself as a philosopher. This was 
based on a rejection of both a knowable human nature and a previously established or 
divinely ordained ideal as a guide that could govern society.  
For Arendt, the problem with speaking of human nature occurred as a result of the 
limits of human awareness: we cannot speak with the same confidence of the essence of 
who we are as a species in the same way as we speak of the stuff that makes up a 
mushroom or a bird. Thus, human efforts to speak of human nature end with an 
inaccessible divinity. So through modern science, with its aim to solve everything 
unknowable, we have created a new Archimedian vantage point from which to regard the 
world. As Margaret Canovan writes, this new Archimedian point encourages man to want 
to master his senses and his understanding of the world. This is in contrast to the 
ancients’ contemplation of nature.12 As Arendt said, while we can determine the essence 
of surrounding matter, we cannot do the same for ourselves- this would be like “jumping 
                                                          
11
 Hannah Arendt. “The Jewish War That Isn’t Happening” in The Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken 
Books,  2007, 174. 
12
 Margaret Canovan. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1974, 
101. 
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over our own shadow.”13  
BIOGRAPHY 
Arendt was certainly not the first to deeply questioning the role of, and 
relationship between, politics and philosophy. As a German Jew born in 1904, Arendt 
found herself in the company of influential philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Karl 
Jaspers and Carl Schmitt. These thinkers wrote during and after the First and Second 
World Wars, and understandably, tried to make sense of these horrific events. Amongst 
this group of contemporaries, the paradigm at that time constituted a direct attack, or at 
least deep questioning of, traditional politics and human relations.  
 Seyla Benhabib addresses Arendt’s critique of contemporary politics and 
modernity in a book entitled The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt.14 Benhabib 
employs three lenses with which to examine Arendt’s work: her portrayal of 
totalitarianism and her reflections on the impact of modernity; her Heideggerian 
“Existenz Philosophy”, and the undeniable influence of Arendt’s biography as an exiled 
German Jewess.  
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
Benhabib suggests that in order to begin to understand Arendt’s project, one must 
first acknowledge her personal circumstances as an exiled German Jewess. Indeed, 
Arendt barely escaped the internment camps of Gurs with her husband Heinrich Blucher 
after receiving emergency visas that allowed them to travel to France15. This theory 
speaks to the theory of politics of the extraordinary: having experienced an extraordinary 
situation, Arendt underwent unprecedented circumstances, thus leading her to deeply 
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 Arendt, (1958), 10 
14
 Seyla Benhabib. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. 
15
 Arendt, (2007), xxii 
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consider the wider, societal implications. In addition to accounting for Arendt’s personal 
experiences, one must then also “de-center”16 Arendt’s best-known work- The Human 
Condition- as the foundation of her thought, and take into account her other works. 
The scope of Arendt’s observations was vast, and in keeping with Arendt’s 
rejection of describing herself solely as a philosopher, Benhabib describes additional 
roles Arendt took on, which included not only political theorist, but social psychologist, 
historian, journalist and storyteller. Benhabib suggests that Arendt analyzed “human 
culture and institutions; political parties and movements; individual and collective 
identities; historical trends and future possibilities.”17  
Margaret Canovan, who wrote the introduction for the Human Condition, 
accounts less for Arendt’s personal circumstances. Canovan takes a relatively 
straightforward approach to Arendt’s work, and underpins her analysis with an emphasis 
on Arendt’s urge to think what we are doing. She claims that Arendt’s thought is based 
on a distinctly human but intangible capacity for freedom. Specifically for Canovan, 
Arendt’s freedom is the ability to engage in thoughtful, political action.18  
 The contrast between Benhabib and Canovan and their theories as to how much 
Arendt’s situation addresses the question of personal circumstances: if it does matter, 
why, and how much? Why is it important to determine what events, and to what extent 
they that shape a person’s outlook, and is this relevant when examining their theories 
divorced from all other factors? We can return to Kalyvas: Arendt’s situation certainly 
qualifies as extraordinary, thus we extract from her thought possibilities and suggested 
solutions that would not have otherwise come to fruition. While this can be true in 
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 Benhabib, (2003), xxv. 
17
 Ibid, 198. 
18
 Canovan (2006), 76. 
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general, and not just for philosophers, Arendt was unique in her breach of boundaries 
between thought and action, theory and practice, or philosophy and politics.  
THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY 
This breach of boundaries raises a question of whether or not theorizing about 
politics and human behavior can exist in a world divorced from reality. In fact, human 
relations, or political action aimed at some ideal, cannot exist esoterically, or solely in 
theory. One can never really step away from the world and live in theory. Theory also 
fails to recognize the unpredictability (or non-scientific quality) of human behavior. For 
example, no one predicted the extent of the destruction of the Holocaust, nor the attacks 
of 9/11. Certainly some individuals have predicted, in general, wars or attacks, but the 
very nature of human behavior is its spontaneity and creativity.  
 The danger then, lies in a primary reliance on theory to guide human relations. 
For if one is always theorizing, one is supposing about the future and how to reach some 
pre-determined ideal or utopia based on the idea of the good or the beautiful. Therefore,  
Arendt approached major philosophical questions with caution- those related to freedom, 
human agency and political ideals. It is important to acknowledge that these questions 
were situated in the context of Leo Strauss’ project.  
A superficial account of Strauss’ project could state that it was aimed at 
determining the limits of human capacity for understanding and processing one’s 
surroundings. Strauss sought to answer the question of whether there is a knowable, 
verifiable truth that is accessible to humans, and if so, whether or not this can be 
extrapolated to politics. Strauss called this the “theological-political predicament”19, or 
                                                          
19
 Rodrigo Chacon. “Hannah Arendt in Weimar: Beyond the Theological-Political Predicament? New 
York: New School for Social Research, 2009. P. 1 
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the question of “norms derived from reason and norms whose source is attributed to 
divine revelation.” Or, in Strauss’ words: “[T]his, indeed, is the question: whether men 
can acquire knowledge of the good, without which they cannot guide their lives 
individually or collectively, by the unaided efforts of their reason, or whether they are 
dependent for that knowledge on divine revelation.”20 Strauss’ questions raised the 
fundamental issue for human affairs: politics or revelation as guidance, and this serves to 
“remind us of what is at stake in politics-the right or the good life and ultimately 
happiness…”21  
THE POLITICAL AND THE SOCIAL 
 One theorist who criticized Arendt’s approach to this question was Hannah Pitkin, 
who framed it in terms of the “hard-headed realist versus the idealist.”22 This criticism 
directly illustrates the tension Arendt explored between philosophy and politics, which 
became a popular subject of debate in the 1950s.  
 Pitkin’s critique is helpful in that it addresses Arendt’s characterization of the 
political, but with an added emphasis on the lives of human beings as being conducted in 
two distinct spheres: public and private. For Arendt, the political started once human 
beings breached the private space and engaged in action and speech. This speech and 
action showed who they are and preserved the space of the public sphere, where freedom 
can ultimately be maintained. It is at this point that many critics of Arendt find fault: her 
conception of the political and social are nebulous and not situated in reality, as Pitkin, 
argued in her book called The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt‘s Concept of the 
                                                          
20Ibid, 3. 
21Ibid, 4. 
22
 Hannah Pitkin. The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998, 36. 
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Social.23 
 According to Pitkin, Arendt’s characterization of the social undermined the power 
inherent in people’s engagement in the political realm. Pitkin decried Arendt’s absolute 
loss of faith in politics, but more generally, she acknowledged the universal problem of 
political theory that Arendt ran into.. As Pitkin wrote: “…[T]he political theorist is 
forever in the paradoxical position of telling people unchangeable truths about what they 
are doing, in hopes of getting them to change what they are doing.” Nevertheless, the 
unique and powerful contribution Arendt made, Pitkin stated, was her portrayal of 
political action as an infinite set of unprompted and individually independent moments- 
the “miracle.”24 
  While several thinkers criticize to Arendt’s concept of the social, Patricia Bowen-
Moore attempted to flesh it out further. Bowen-Moore defines it as “members of a 
species collected under the conditions of organized mass living together.” She regarded 
the social man in Marxist terms, stating that he is defined by the worldlessness caused by 
the capitalist, imperialist economy and the privilege it awarded to the private world. This 
privileging of the private world caused the loss of the common world and the subsequent 
loss of privacy necessary for people who venture into the public realm.25  
 Stepping beyond the specifics of Arendt’s thought, most critics acknowledge her 
contribution in that she encouraged a new way to think about politics. Arendt’s unique 
contribution can be attributed to the influence of her personal experiences as an exiled, 
stateless person. Interestingly, despite, or perhaps because of, this experience, Arendt 
                                                          
23Ibid, 36. 
24Ibid, 49. 
25
 Patricia Bowen-Moore. Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. 
125. 
 19 
lamented the loss of nobility, and even relevance, of politics. This lament was also 
colored by her time as a reporter on the Eichmann trial, when she witnessed horrific 
accounts of the ultimate degradation of politics. 
  This lament for nobility in politics is the reason many people feel she glorified 
the ancient regimes of Athens and Sparta. In much of the Human Condition, Arendt 
addressed the idealism of these regimes in rigorous exegeses of Plato and Aristotle. 
However, it should be noted that her aim, according to Thomas Pangle in his book the 
Spirit of Modern Republicanism, was not to literally recreate a modern version of the 
ancient regimes. Rather, Arendt was engaged in “creative reconstructionism.” Indeed, 
Pangle allows that she discounted many of the negative traits associated with the Roman 
and Greek regimes, such as the exclusionary and violent nature of their polities.26 
ARENDT AND HEIDEGGER’S EXISTENZ PHILOSOPHY 
Arendt’s rigorous exegesis of the ancient regimes was encouraged during her 
graduate school studies with Martin Heidegger, who himself focused extensively on Plato 
and Aristotle. Arendt’s association with Heidegger, not surprisingly, had a deep influence 
on her thought. Seyla Benhabib addresses this influence, specifically, of Heidegger’s 
“Existenz” philosophy. For Arendt, the implications of Heidegger’s Dasein and being-in-
the-world meant that human beings exist in the world as a plurality; a group of 
individuals who experience life solely as one of a group in which their fellow human 
beings are distinct and equal.27 Arendt expanded on what she felt was the defining 
characteristic of Dasein: its “temporality and finitude,” and the anonymity of das man. 
Arendt felt that man’s ability to speak broke this condition of anonymity and 
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temporality.28 
 Arendt had a troubled and complicated relationship with Heidegger for many 
reasons, including his reported association with the Nazi party and national socialism. 
Specifically, Arendt addressed her own difficulties with Heidegger and his concept of 
Dasein in an essay called “What is Existenz Philosophy?” when she wrote that “…it is 
obvious that concepts of this kind can only lead us out of philosophy and into some kind 
of nature-oriented superstition. If it does not belong to the concept of man that he inhabits 
the earth together with others of his kind, then all that remains for him is a mechanical 
reconciliation by which the atomized Selves are provided with a common ground that is 
essentially alien to their nature.”29  
While it is easy to get caught up in Heidgger’s theory, what matters as far as 
Arendt’s thought is concerned is that she connected the breakdown of social relations 
(lack of civic, social and political expression and organizations) and alienation of 
individuals with the seeds of totalitarianism and authoritarianism, Benhabib writes. 
Arendt attributed Heidegger’s dismissal of the plurality of human beings as that which 
lead to radical isolation of individuals, and eventually, totalitarianism.30 As Benhabib 
explains, the “lack of action as interaction” is the danger.31 So while Heidegger’s impact 
was profound, Arendt’s theories ended in a particularly oppositional stance in that 
natality opposes Heidegger’s “being-unto-death” because its isolation is replaced by 
plurality and the capacity for speech and action.32 
 
                                                          
28Arendt (1958) 178. 
29Benhabib, 54. 
30Ibid, 104. 
31Ibid, 71. 
32Ibid 109-110. 
 21 
NATALITY 
 Patricia Bowen-Moore gives natality a threefold definition. Primarily, it is a 
biological birth; secondarily, it is “birth into the realm of action;” and thirdly, it is “birth 
into the realm of timeless thought.”33 Like Benhabib, Bowen-Moore sees Heidegger’s 
Dasein- being thrown into the world and towards death, as opposite to Arendt’s natality, 
and indeed a “long-needed balance to the tradition‘s (philosophy’s) apparent prejudice.” 
 Bowen-Moore explains natality further by saying that the love of the world and 
shared human experiences lend a “moral rectitude,” despite the amoral qualities of 
natality and plurality. This explains Arendt’s declaration of political natality as the 
antithesis of totalitarianism and the loss of individuality, and the subsequent destruction 
of freedom through terror, Bowen-Moore writes. In practical political terms, citizenship 
formally preserves human action and plurality in that it guarantees accessibility to the 
public and common realm, Bowen Moore writes.34  
JEWISH WRITINGS- INTRODUCTION 
 The Jewish Writings is a collection of essays spanning four decades: the 1930s, 
40s, 50s and 60s. During this time, Arendt engaged in different activities, most of them 
politically oriented and most as an observer and commentator. Her commentary in the 
Jewish Writings is mainly an unabashedly critical attack on contemporary politics, and 
the associated corruption of ideals. As she wrote in a 1942 essay, the contemporary goals 
of freedom and justice, with democracy as the means of realizing these goals, were 
“corrupted and dragged through the mud by an uprooted bohemianism.” This “uprooted” 
class Arendt referred to is the elite class of the European Jewry, which consisted of 
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opportunistic “millionaires and philanthropists” and businessmen. This class, as a result 
of their failure to recognize the equality of the fight for freedom with the very fight for 
survival, Arendt wrote, acquired a permanent victimhood status. As a result, the only 
ideals that could rescue this society- freedom and justice- became “abstract…concepts for 
feeble old men.”35  
 In even more certain terms, Arendt blamed this degradation on a change in 
consciousness in society, and partly on the “young” generation (ages 20 to 70). This 
generation, she said, exhibited an insidious superficiality in that they demanded little 
more of their politicians than “opportunism stripped of principles, and propaganda but 
not policies.” As a result, a false sense of trust was built not on the substance of a great 
man, but on “blood and soil and horoscopes”. This represents the “realpolitik” of this age 
for Arendt. The horrible outcome, she wrote, is a “despotic” regime in which cliques and 
clans prevail, individuals are atomized and opportunistic businessmen-turned-politicians 
denounce family “for the sake of their careers or personal security.”36 In terms of the 
political result, Arendt wrote that this power-seeking mentality led to the tragic failure to 
establish a Jewish Army, which she repeatedly called for as a means to strengthening and 
protecting the Jewish community. 
It follows then, using the established framework for this thesis in which practice 
and theory are seen as parallel, that we can assume that given her lack of trust in 
contemporary politics, Arendt saw widespread corruption of both practice (action) and 
theory. This theory is even more plausible if one keeps in mind her platform in the Jewish 
Writings: Aufbau was a political publication read by many influential thinkers and 
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politicians, the very individuals she accused of possessing corrupted ideas and ideals. 
Witness the writing style in Aufbau: overtly polemical and confrontational. Subtlety and 
nuance, in this case, were overshadowed by strong language and calls to action as she 
attempted to, at the very least, raise awareness, and ideally, rouse people to action. As 
Jerome Kohn says in the Preface, these political articles provide a Jewish perspective in 
which she called for individual Jews to mobilize to action.37  
Kohn notes, however, that she also demanded thoughtful consideration and 
conversation prior to action when it came to action in a plurality of people working 
towards a cause. As he writes, she asked “…individual Jews to join together, not only to 
form an army, but also to sit down at a table and discuss their differences: not to disown 
their own opinions but to think about and seriously consider opinions other than their 
own, and by speaking and listening to their peers rise above their disagreements and 
participate in the formation of a genuine Jewish plurality.”  
 It is typical of Arendt to have fervently demanded of her fellow Jews (in this case 
but any actor in general) action tempered with a caution to think prior to doing so. If one 
takes a step back, one can see the thread of natality running through this formula of 
thinking before doing as crucial for human beings living in a troubled world. Arendt 
defined natality, in part, as the opportunity for thought and action within the present 
moment. This moment contains the potential for a new beginning,38 and is available to 
anyone. Furthermore, natality allows people to participate in the highest activity human 
beings are capable of: action. The problem for civilization, when extraordinarily evil 
things can eventually happen, occurs when people do not use the capacity to think first.  
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 Arendt’s call to action contains a paradox, however, at least along her line of 
thought. Action is often spontaneous (indeed, Arendt even endorsed spontaneous political 
uprisings such as in the Warsaw concentration camp) and frequently unaccompanied by 
deep thought. But this paradox illustrates the tension between, and fragility of, human 
affairs. Spontaneous action, fortified by courage, is absolutely necessary for political 
survival of individuals and groups, even if it is not imbued with an abundance of previous 
thought. This is a danger of which Arendt spoke: the unpredictability of action and 
revealing oneself in the public sphere. Nevertheless, action, underpinned with natality, is 
paramount, despite the peril. 
 The following analysis of the Jewish Writings is divided up into themes: Political 
conditions; historical conditions; human rights and anti-Semitism; normalization of 
Jewish politics; political participation, Zionism, and Arendt’s political philosophy. 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
We can return to Kalyvas’ politics of the extraordinary (as outlined in the 
literature review) to examine the grounds for Arendt’s attack on politics. Never before, at 
least in Arendt’s opinion, had the actions (or lack of action) of human beings ever 
prompted such a wholly evil degradation of humanity. She described the concentration 
camps as a realized hell earth- as real as “stones and houses and trees”-39 that created a 
new type of human being. Ostensibly, this meant a disposable human being; a mere 
organic creation stripped of dignity and the ability to act, perhaps similar to those living 
in the mass society she described in Origins of Totalitarianism. As she described, “By 
pressing men against each other, total terror destroys the space between 
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them…(Totalitarian government) destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom 
which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space.”40 This realized 
hell, for Arendt, represented a breach of boundaries; a realization of the human capacity 
for evil that occurs with an abandonment of thought amongst the inhabitants of the solely 
human realm.  
 For Arendt, the radical evil present in the concentration camps represented an 
extraordinary situation. Kalyvas’ theory can thus shed some light on the capacity of 
human beings to perpetrate evil upon one another. But in trying to understand, however, 
it should be noted that the point is not that through the tracing of the origins can one 
claim to prevent such a phenomenon in the future, but that we can perhaps locate the 
seminal events and be alert to them should they reoccur. Through this location and 
acknowledgement of seminal events, thoughtful action can be aimed at remaining 
conscious of one‘s actions and one‘s responsibility to fellow human beings, which can 
shed further light on humanity. 
 Arendt’s urging to think what we are doing also suggests another aspect of 
thoughtful action and of the merger between theory and practice. In preceding action with 
thought, we are breaching a boundary that lies between these two human capacities for 
self-expression. We also breach another boundary: thought is the internal dialogue with 
oneself, thus when we act, we cross the boundary into a plurality of human beings in that 
we are (hopefully) aware that our actions have the potential to be seen and heard by our 
fellow human beings. It is conceivable that this is what Arendt meant when she urged 
people to think what they are doing: thoughtful action escorts human beings from an 
isolated experience to one in which he or she is considering those around him and 
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acknowledging the plurality of the human condition. Without this step, society is on 
precarious footing, with any missteps potentially leading to extraordinary situations such 
as extreme dehumanization of the concentration camps.  
 In attempting to understand the events that led to this extraordinary circumstance, 
Arendt controversially placed part of the responsibility on the Jewish people themselves. 
In particularly harsh language, Arendt stated that the apathy of the Jews, and their politics 
aimed solely at survival, over 200 years, nurtured an instinct to escape attention by 
“playing dead.” As a result, Jews allowed themselves to be ruled by plutocrats and 
philanthropists, Arendt stated, and their only participation in society consisted of raising 
money. As Jerome Kohn writes, Arendt believed Jews were merely and “necessarily 
willing pawns…used by the monarchy, the aristocracy, the liberals and discarded by each 
of those opposed factions, when their usefulness, which was financial, was either used up 
or no longer deemed socially desirable.”41 As a result, political organization was 
anathema to their existence, and should an enemy approach, the Jewish people planned 
for future survival at the expense of their current reality.42 Although it is an 
uncomfortable exercise, we can attempt to understand why Arendt located part of the 
blame on Jewish apathy if we look at the way she viewed reason and history in an essay 
in the Jewish Writings.  
HISTORICAL CONDITIONS 
 First, it is helpful to turn to her words on history in an essay on Walter Benjamin 
in her work called Men in Dark Times. She wrote: “Insofar as the past has been 
transmitted as tradition, it possesses authority; insofar as authority presents itself 
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historically, it becomes tradition.”43 Further, tradition sorts out the past chronologically 
and systematically, ie it sifts through events to discriminate positive from negative; 
orthodox from heretical; obligatory from relevant and interesting opinion from data. 
According to Arendt, Benjamin’s method of assessing the past required a tabula rasa 
articulation of the past; an articulation that is free of the judgment attached to tradition to 
dictate how one understands something. Arendt used the metaphor of a pearl diver, who 
descends to the muck of the ocean floor, extracts the fruits of the ocean (pearls/thoughts) 
and returns with a living fragment of the past from which one gleans value for the present 
day.44 
Through this lens, Arendt proceeded in the Jewish Writings with an examination 
of Jewish history in Europe. Arendt explained the history of Jews in Europe, including, 
assimilation or emancipation and Anti-Semitism. She began with the Jewish quest for 
emancipation upon witnessing the modern Enlightenment project of tolerance- or 
universal human rights- in contemporary language.  
Arendt framed her historical account in a 1930s essay called “The Enlightenment 
and The Jewish Question” with the question of history versus reason as educator, and 
drew upon two thinkers who were particularly influential upon this debate: Gotthard 
Ephraim Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn45. For Arendt, the approaches of Mendelssohn 
and Lessing to history provide valuable- and opposing-tools with which to trace the 
social place of Jews in Europe in modern history. Lessing’s privileging of reason as a 
supreme source of truth contrasts with Mendelssohn’s view of history as educator and 
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illuminator of mistakes and lessons. Essentially, these two thinkers represent the debate 
surrounding human access to “truth”, which is the debate between reason and revelation. 
And while Mendelssohn incorporated Lessing’s reliance on reason, he rejected the 
individualist orientation of the German Romantics. Instead, he took up the cause for Jews 
who believed in their place as exclusive heirs to divine revelation through the Old 
Testament.  
In addition to Lessing and Mendelssohn, Arendt discussed Herder46, who rejected 
Lessing’s notion of a human being as autonomous and in pursuit of an accessible truth. 
For Herder, reason is not a rational means of accessing the truth; rather, it is a progressive 
process that blankets all human beings in the quest. Such is history: a progressive, endless 
procession to an infinite truth. The point in explicating the positions of Lessing, 
Mendelssohn and Herder is that through their enmeshed views of history, the Jews’ 
history came to be seen as defined by their possession of the Old Testament, Arendt 
wrote- as the history of “God’s chosen people.” Not only that, but a chosen people who 
were forcefully dispersed, and as a result, transmitted their belief in the past as an 
authoritative, lawful force on present, daily life to those with whom they came in contact. 
For Herder, this explanation served to explain Jews’ “foreignness,” as well as their 
continued association with the Palestinian state. The state represented Jews’ tie to the past 
and its authority. 
This situation created the fierce, violent oppression of the Jewish people, Herder 
believed, which lead to the modern Jewish question of assimilation and/or emancipation. 
The question is then a problem, as Jews can relinquish their role as the chosen people and 
assimilate, which aligns with the Enlightenment project of individualistic search for truth. 
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However, this would run counter to the Jewish idea of reliance on history and religion as 
definitive of the community and its moral and legal dictates.47 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-SEMITISM 
While Enlightenment promised something called universal human rights, the Jews 
faced an existential dilemma, as previously discussed. In order to assimilate into modern 
Europe, they were implicitly required to abandon the very history that defined them as a 
people in order to secure these rights and be granted emancipation. In theory, a 
generation of Jews embraced this idea, Arendt wrote in the 1930s essay called “Original 
Assimilation.” However, in reality, in day-to-day practice, individual Jews wrestled with 
the prospect when faced with the very personal question of baptism. This situation 
illustrates the reality that theoretical musings translated into real-world issues for Jews, as 
Arendt stated: “The Jewish question becomes a problem of the individual Jew.” For 
example, in an example of practice and theory colliding in the real lives of Jews, “the 
baptismal movement in the next generation shows that the Jewish question had become 
by then a problem for the individual Jew, had become the problem of somehow coming 
to terms with the world.”48  
Regardless of the prevalence of Enlightenment debate about human rights in 
contemporary Europe, the reality was that Jews were not included in this conversation, let 
alone regarded as potential recipients of these rights. Instead, Jews, who were 
consistently the victim of Anti-Semitism, participated in society on the periphery, from 
their financial role in the 19th Century to their violent casting out of modern society in the 
Holocaust. Anti-Semitism, she stated, was first manifest at the social level, and then, 
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through daily occurrences, became culturally entrenched. As a result, Jews seeking 
emancipation could achieve this only by assuming the roles of either “philanthropist or 
freeloader. All those who exempted themselves from this alternative were lost from the 
Jewish world,” Arendt wrote.49 This scenario originally occurred because at first “the Jew 
held status in society only as a usurer, just as in its culture he was only an enemy of 
Christ. In the feudal Christian world, status indicated profession.”50 Status and 
profession, for the Jews, were “predetermined by religion,” thus fusing hatred for the 
Jewish people with hatred for their religion, Arendt explained. This hatred was, more 
often than not, a “random association” divorced from reality, although this arbitrary 
origin of the hatred did not lessen its growth.  
In the shift to the modern era, this hatred morphed to a more economically and 
politically motivated anti-Semitism. Called “court Jews,” a select group acted as an 
economic link to state leaders, who in turn, granted them protection. Slowly, these “court 
Jews” became “creditor of absolutist states.”51 As a result, Jews were incrementally 
awarded civil rights, but only on an economic, thus superficial and unequal basis. They 
were not enshrined and were only dependent on financial health, so presumably they 
could easily be rescinded at the whim of the state. “Human rights were ranked according 
to the ability to pay. General privileges, tantamount to emancipation, were not a ‘gift,’ 
but rather an exact compensation in the form of a reward,” she stated.52  
NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM 
The economic situation, for Arendt, provided a strong explanation for anti-
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Semitism, and she based this on her opinion of the capitalist, imperialist regime. This 
regime created a system that was ravenous for entire “continents,” as opposed to the 
“limited territories” sought by nationalist tendencies. As a result, in a 1940s era essay 
responding to Zionist proposals, Arendt dismissed the possibility of a Jewish state 
“within an imperialist sphere of interest” as being the most dangerous outcome for Jews 
that would “arous(e) imperialist passion as a substitute for outdated nationalism, once the 
motor to set men into action.”53 
A subset of imperialism, nationalism was an equally offensive force (particularly 
German-inspired nationalism) for Arendt. This was because the imperialist drive 
rendered the nation an “organic” body inevitably poised for eternal growth. Its peoples, 
then, were simply fuel for this body’s growth- “biological superhuman personalities.” In 
this light, nationalism was especially harmful to Jews, because in order for a Jewish sense 
of nationalism to exist, it was dependent on the “force of a foreign nation.” For the 
Jewish state, this was a collection of Arab states, and therefore a situation in which Jews 
must “either ask protection from an outside power against their neighbors or come to a 
working agreement with their neighbors.”54  
Jews were inherently the victims in this imperial regime, as even though it 
functioned famously for many nations, it squeezed out many peoples in its drive to 
wealth and acquisition. This was due in part to the Jews’ statelessness and the associated 
lack of entrenched human rights for all. As a result, they were excluded from both “the 
national life” and the class struggles of their country, so not only are they stateless, but 
they do not fit in anywhere, either as a minority or a proletarian. As a result, their status 
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as persons subject to laws is non-existent, and thus they were un-naturalized. This reality, 
Arendt explained, constituted fertile ground for the creation of the concentration camps.55 
NORMALIZATION OF JEWISH POLITICS  
Given the historical extent of anti-Semitism and their stateless status in a nation-
state oriented world, in the Jewish Writings, Arendt advocated for the “normalization” of 
Jewish politics.56 This seemingly simplistic goal spoke to her fervent wish for Jews to 
secure a safe foothold in society. As she put it in a 1930s essay on Anti-Semitism, 
normalization would create the “conditions for the development of the Jewish substance. 
To become a people like all other peoples- that is the goal, but always with the specific 
provision: like all other peoples.”57 In terms of outcome, for Arendt this meant the 
possession of a physically bounded state of their own, in which all Jews, not just “court” 
or wealthy Jews, enjoyed full human rights, not just an arbitrary collection of civil rights. 
In her own words, this means a “fully accredited international representation of Jewish 
Palestine that enjoys equal rights with all others.” This meant, in real terms, several 
components: representation at the United Nations in relation to negotiations surrounding 
Jewish/Palestine statehood and immigration, the establishment of a Jewish Army, and 
recognition of Second World War efforts by Jewish people.58 
However, although a theoretical proposal regarding a Jewish state was a fine idea, 
Arendt identified a major roadblock in the form of a collective lack of optimism amongst 
Jews. Centuries of oppression, statelessness and enslavement had violently eroded this 
quality. As she wrote, oppressed peoples abandon even the basic hope of defending 
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themselves, and become a “living corpse,” and worse, a people that is restricted from 
self-defense becomes a “victim of world history.”59 This apathy reached its apex in the 
concentration camps, where Jews suffered from a soul-destroying sense of 
meaninglessness, Arendt wrote:  “Hope stronger than man- that means hope destructive 
of the very humanity of man…Their apathy was to a very large extent the almost 
physical, automatic response to the challenge of absolute meaninglessness.”60 
Although I doubt there is little value added by my own judgment of Arendt’s 
statements from a contemporary, and incomparably safe situation in life, I have difficulty 
with her discussion of apathy. Apathy implies a lack of emotion or spirit. Arendt stated 
that it was first manifest in the Jewish people when they began leaving their fate in the 
hands of “plutocrats and philanthropists.” It was first intended as a means of survival, as 
she described it in a 1940s essay called “The Jewish War That Isn’t Happening,” and this 
behavior resembled an animal playing dead to deflect attackers. However, she wrote that 
true danger for the Jewish people was not being attacked, but rather the exhibition of 
hope for a miracle. Paranoia was common, even when conditions were relatively safe.61 
Nevertheless, as a result of this docile acceptance of Anti-Semitism as a safe 
status quo, agitating or incendiary movements such as political solidarity in organizations 
were seen as “demagogic nonsense.” In other words, Arendt characterized the Jewish 
people as a passive and reactionary, second class citizenry that was satisfied with mere 
survival. It should be noted that this description appears to restrict comments related to 
the political and social involvement of the Jewish people, and is not meant as a normative 
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commentary on the qualities or personality traits. As she wrote, “…if the enemy is at the 
gate, we make constructive plans for the future-and forget about the coming day. When 
you realize what is at stake here, it could make your skin crawl.” 
To be fair, in speaking of apathy in the context of the concentration camps, 
Arendt did not appear to use the term in a derogatory fashion. Rather, it is almost used in 
the literal sense- that is, a people absolutely depleted of pathos in the face of prolonged 
misery, both for oneself and watching one’s fellows suffer. More horrifically, Arendt 
referred to the fact that the sense of hope remaining amongst people trapped in the 
concentration camps was used as an implement to maintain their humanity, almost as a 
sole remedy to the dehumanizing effects of the camps. In this sense, the strictly human 
capacity to hope and project into the future for improving conditions was captured and 
capitalized upon in order to squeeze out the very last human essence. This is the essence 
of totalitarianism, according to Arendt: the absolute dehumanizing, amassing effect that 
eliminates individuality and freedom by eliminating a human being’s ability to move and 
act.62  
In analyzing the ability of the Jews to act in a regime of terror as a political 
journalist writing in Aufbau, Arendt has a decidedly unique perspective. She located 
some fault with the Jewish people for their lack of action in general, and their lack of 
participation in the social and political spheres. In instances they did act, Arendt 
described heroic and inspirational results when action and a united front emerged in dire 
circumstances. Action displayed itself in the form of solidarity amongst Jews, which 
could be seen as the flipside of apathy. This solidarity aggregated over time in response 
                                                          
62
 Arendt (1955), 466. 
 35 
to a common enemy, since “a common enemy can only awaken solidarity.” 63 (This 
common enemy Arendt referred to were the state regimes surrounding Israel and the Nazi 
regime.)  According to Arendt, solidarity, and hope for an end to oppression, can be 
salvaged by even a miniscule sliver of hope for success in a fight against an enemy. As a 
result, it was better, at least from the standpoint of the possibility of survival, to belong to 
or support a guerrilla troop with food and supplies, than to sit in a concentration camp, or 
to participate in mass labor efforts, Arendt wrote. This was because doing what one was 
told engendered apathy and eroded the spirit of resistance. So in order for Jews to survive 
and fight back, the entire population of Europe (not just Jews) needed to “seethe with 
unrest” and “Anti-Semitism first had to be destroyed within the bloody school of Nazi 
terror for the courage of despair, which drives individuals to suicide, can never organize a 
people.” In other words, citizens- Jews and non-Jews alike- had to reject apathy, and 
stand up against the terror created by the “policy of wiping out entire populations (which) 
made blind obedience more dangerous than open rebellion.”64  
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In terms of her own actions, Arendt’s call to shake off this apathy, and participate 
in thoughtful action manifest itself in her daily life. Although she was never directly 
involved in political affairs in a traditional capacity such as elected official, she 
participated in some fashion for most of her life in an indirect manner. This involvement 
and practice in the public, political realm informed her writings throughout her life on 
many levels. Included in her activities were her political pieces for Aufbau, her constant 
engagement in conversation about political matters with her peers and politicians, and she 
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volunteered with Youth Aliyah, an organization that aimed to help German and eastern 
European Jewish youth with the emigration process to Palestine.65  
Arendt’s belief in action (not only large group-based political actions such as 
uprisings, but small, individual daily actions) is particularly evident in a 1930s essay 
called “Some young people are going home.” In this essay, she spoke of the hopeless 
futures of the children of displaced and “stateless” Jewish families, who had “no future” 
in terms of a profession, and were “exploited” by their parents’ demands that they work.  
In an attempt to give these youths a chance at future employment and integration in 
society, an Israeli-based organization called Youth Aliyah brought them to Palestine 
where they received “schooling and practical education.” The result, Arendt wrote, was a 
solidarity among an “entire, large group” who could “build the country for himself and 
others, and for those who will come after him…This joy, this dignity and this youth will 
be converted into strength and this strength will rebuild the country.66”  
Arendt was especially pleased with one young man, who, upon moving to 
Palestine, was able to “solve the Jewish question in a practical way through agriculture.” 
This is a telling statement: Arendt’s idealism of achieving justice and freedom through 
securing a homeland for the Jews is fortified, but tempered, with her realism: in order to 
realize an ideal, one must necessarily take less than appealing, or risky actions-ie youths 
moving away from their families to a new homeland. But a natural human capacity for 
adaptation and resilience can quickly remedy the situation, she stated. “As for the 
children, as soon as they are put in a different atmosphere and given work, they quickly 
recover their natural dignity.” In addition to this material goal of creating employment 
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opportunities, Youth Aliyah’s goal at a larger scale was to slowly undermine the 
pervasive anti-semitism of the time by imbuing Jewish youth with hope and pride they so 
lacked.67 
ARENDT’S EMERGING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY  
 There are two ways in which we can distill Arendt’s political philosophy in the 
Jewish Writings. The first is to examine her practical, political suggestions in terms of the 
recommendations she made for issues such as securing a Jewish state in Palestine, or 
urging her fellow Jews to action. Secondly, we can analyze the accompanying 
commentary to these suggestions.  
 To begin with, we can turn to some particularly revealing comments related to 
political participation that appear in a 1960s essay called “The Eichmann Controversy”. 
In this response to an abundance of negative reactions following the release of Eichmann 
in Jerusalem68, Arendt explained her critique of a lack of action on the part of Jews who 
were forced to participate in the Nazi regime. While she asserted that the possibility of 
resisting was “non-existent,” she suggested that “there existed the possibility of doing 
nothing.” This did not require any extraordinary display of strength, rather, it called for a 
simple declaration of one’s status as a “simple Jew,” Arendt wrote.69 However, even this 
action (Arendt called it a possibility of nonparticipation) was extremely difficult given 
the corrosive effect of the totalitarian system, but she wrote that these people still had a 
“limited freedom of decision and action.” 
 The point is that even in an atmosphere in which the realm of possible actions is 
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reduced to a choice of not acting, this is still a personalized, individual choice in that it is 
preceded by thought and a careful consideration of one’s political and social 
surroundings. As she wrote, “These people still had a certain, limited freedom of decision 
and of action…Since we are dealing in politics with men, and not with heroes or saints, it 
is this possibility of nonparticipation.”70 
 This limited option of nonparticipation illustrates the effectiveness of the 
totalitarian regime and its goal of suffocating the potential to act, and thus the vital signs 
of a healthy society: freedom and justice. But still, the possibility of action remained an 
eternal, infinite option available to human beings, therefore achieving freedom and 
justice was still a possibility. However, for Arendt, that is achieved only when human 
beings act, especially in the face of oppression, or worse, death. So action supersedes 
ideals upheld by human beings, even in a devastated society.  
Despite this focus on action, Arendt revealed in her own political philosophy the 
remnants of a tendency towards idealism: that is, she still aimed at freedom and justice. 
In a 1940s essay called “Jewish Politics,” Arendt exhibited her belief in the need of a 
people to uphold ideals when she wrote that “the only political ideals an oppressed people 
can have are freedom and justice.”71 The danger, however, in upholding ideals is that 
they become empty and meaningless, Arendt wrote. A society wedded to empty ideals is 
engaged in a type of realpolitik, she wrote in this essay. In this atmosphere, businessmen 
pursue meaningless wins and losses and stock market gains; intellectual activity is seen 
as worthless and the self is of primary importance. Dictatorships trump democracy and 
“might makes right.” In particular for Jewish politics, de-moralized Jews worship those 
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who hold the reins of power, having never held onto them for themselves. The way 
Arendt described it, there is little hope that the Jewish people can “relearn” the language 
of freedom and justice.72  
 However, Arendt acknowledged that while the Jewish people may have forgotten 
these ideals of freedom and justice, that does not preclude them from attaining them. 
Even having forgotten these ideals, the Jewish people were historically steadfast in their 
will to live, although for two centuries, it had been “degenerating” into the will to survive 
at any price. The result of this degeneration was a secular and demoralized people 
stripped of any nationalistic sentiment. It is also a people who do not experience the very 
human sentiment of pleasure. This demoralized people, who lack nationalistic spirit, is 
the very reason Arendt demanded the formation of a Jewish army. As she wrote, “the 
defense of Palestine is part of the struggle for freedom of the Jewish people.”73 The 
creation of an army is explicitly not a utopian goal, Arendt said, but in her opinion, 
entailed a stringent requirement: the participation of all Jews from all states.74 Uniform 
participation in the army would also allow Jews to feel ownership of a defeat of Hitler 
and true freedom, and thus “put an end-and an honorable end- to all fantastical talk about 
a Jewish war.” This, for Arendt, was because “you can only defend yourself as the person 
you are attacked as.” 
More specifically in terms of a Jewish army, Arendt called for participation not 
from wealthy and privileged Jews, but at the grassroots. As she wrote, “…only the people 
themselves are strong enough for a true alliance.” So Arendt was suggesting that Jews 
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draw on their strong will to survive and funnel their action to form an army, despite their 
statelessness.75 This action would allow entry into the international state structure, she 
seems to be suggesting. The problem is that this very statelessness makes it difficult for 
Jews to defend themselves as Jews; they have no homeland from which to launch 
themselves.  
ZIONISM 
 Arendt’s theories on Zionism (the movement to establish a Jewish state in Israel) 
are central to understanding her political philosophy. In the Introduction to the Jewish 
Writings, Ron Feldman explains that Arendt based her theories on those of thinkers 
Theodor Herzl and Bernard Lazare, who shared her experience as a Jew rejected by their 
own community. Arendt found merit in both thinkers, but was partial to Lazare, since she 
had difficulty with the fact that Herzl’s call for a Jewish state was based on a belief that  
anti-semitism was unchangeable and eternal. This false belief, she wrote in a 1940s essay 
called “Zionism Reconsidered” was corrosive because it “led to a very dangerous 
misappraisal of political conditions in every country.”76 However, Arendt admired 
Herzl’s intellectual bent and tendency to call his fellow Jews to action. For Arendt, 
Herzl’s Zionism ultimately boiled down to realpolitik, or international relations, and in 
negotiating for a Jewish state in this context, meant fleeing reality and ignoring politics 
rather than attempting to assimililate.77 
 With this reaction to Herzl in mind, we can now witness Arendt’s closer 
allegiance to Lazare. Rather than seeing the Jews as an outcast people who must flee the 
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international structure into an isolated state of their own, Lazare-who coined Arendt’s 
preferred terms of ‘pariah’ and ‘parvenu’ to describe Jews- insisted on using Jews’ pariah 
(outsider) status as a tool for political analysis, as opposed to this status being an 
unchanging reality. In this context, Lazare called for a Jewish nation first, and the 
establishment of a territory second.78 The commonality Arendt saw between Herzl and 
Lazare, and that which she incorporated into her analysis (and her subsequent political 
philosophy), was a call to action to the Jewish people, both the masses and the elites. This 
call to action, in terms of the Zionist movement, particularly translated for Arendt into a 
call for a Jewish cultural centre (a Yishuv) in Palestine. This Yishuv would not be merely 
the creation of a new, physically bounded territory in the international state system, but it 
would necessarily be a conscious effort on the part of the Jewish people, writes 
Feldman.79 This effort would include the establishment of a Hebrew University, health 
centers and agricultural efforts, and despite the fact that their creation would be 
“artificial”, it would constitute action, and therefore a “positive response” to the lack of a 
homeland on the part of the Jews, for Arendt.  As she wrote, “…the responses were of 
much more permanent human and political value than the challenges, and that only 
ideological distortions made it appear that the challenges by themselves-anti-Semitism, 
poverty, national homelessness-had produced something.”80 
In discussing these two mainstream methods of solving the Jewish problem in 
relation to nationalism (Zionism or assimilation), Arendt said there are two solutions: 
“complete assimilation-that is actual disappearance- or emigration.”  The problem is, 
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then, that both alternatives represent an escape from reality, and a retreat from the fight 
against anti-Semitism.81 In this context, it is important to note that the creation of a 
sovereign and homogenous Jewish state was insufficient for Arendt. Rather, in keeping 
with her practical nature, Arendt espoused a bi-national confederate state, which, in her 
opinion, would acknowledge the reality of the minority Arab population. As she wrote, 
“The very term ‘confederation’ indicates the existence of two independent political 
entities, as contrasted with a federal system, which is usually regarded as ‘a multiple 
government in a single state.”82 Indeed, Arendt wrote that a minority-majority structure 
was “insoluble by definition.” In terms of institutional structure, a common government 
for Palestines and Jews would be based upon “community councils,” a structure that 
would encourage resolution of issues at the “lowest and most promising level of 
proximity and neighborliness.”83 
Arendt based these suggestions on the writings of Dr.Judah Magnes, a thinker 
who acknowledged the historical and religious claim of both Palestinians and Jews to the 
territory. Without a “regional federation,” structure, tensions would continue and 
relations would dissolve into ongoing conflict. The homogenous Jewish state would then 
build up an army that was highly dependent on U.S. funds, sparking further acrimony 
with Arab neighbors. Arendt was so invested and hopeful about this suggestion that in a 
1950s essay called “Federation or Balkanization,” she expressed a belief that such a 
federated structure “could serve as a model for the whole region.” 84 For Arendt, a strict 
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partitioning of a Jewish state would be “wishful thinking” that would “result in arrested 
development for both peoples.” Worse, it would create a platform from which to launch 
war.  
 The other aspect of Arendt’s suggestion of a confederated, binational state was an 
acknowledgement of an Israeli state’s “economic isolation.” As it stood, without 
integration into not only the region, but the international economy, Israelis would be 
unable to support future generations. Modernization and integration would create a 
situation more conducive to peace amongst residents, and would avoid the nurturing of 
“rampant nationalism,” which, Arendt wrote, could easily encourage the dangerous 
situation of “national sovereignty, which so long had been the very symbol of free 
national developments, has become the greatest danger to national survival for small 
nations.” 85 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE JEWISH WRITINGS 
 In attempting to determine an Arendtian political philosophy in the Jewish 
Writings, it is worth quoting at length her suggestions regarding the Jewish question 
related to the establishment of a state. It should be noted that her practical suggestions 
changed slightly during the course of her career, but the philosophy, or essence, remains 
consistent, which will be discussed shortly. This excerpt appears in a 1940s essay called 
“To Save the Jewish Homeland”. 
“…the following axiomatic criteria for the good and the bad, the right and 
the wrong: 1) the real goal of the Jews in Palestine is the building up of a 
Jewish homeland. This goal must never be sacrificed to the pseudo-
sovereignty of a Jewish state. 2) The independence of Palestine can be 
achieved only on a solid basis of Jewish-Arab co-operation. As long as 
Jewish and Arab leaders both claim that there is ‘no bridge’  between Jews 
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and Arabs (as Moshe Shertok has put it) , the territory cannot be left to the 
political wisdom of its own inhabitants. 3) The elimination of all terrorist 
groups (and not agreements with them) and swift punishment of all 
terrorist deeds (and not merely protests against them) will be the only 
valid proof that the Jewish people in Palestine has recovered its sense of 
political reality and that Zionist leadership is again responsible enough to 
be trusted with the destinies of the yishuv. 4) Immigration to Palestine, 
limited in numbers and time, is the only ‘irreducible minimum’ in Jewish 
politics. 5) Local self government and mixed Jewish-Arab municipal and 
rural councils, on a small scale and as numerous as possible, are the only 
realistic political measures that can eventually lead to the political 
emancipation of Palestine. It is still not too late.”86 
 
 If we return to Arendt’s first statement, we can see that, even in the choice of 
words (homeland), she favored language that appeals to the hearts and minds of readers, 
rather than the dry, bureaucratic language of international relations. Above all else, for 
Arendt, Jews must feel at home, regardless of whether or not they have international 
recognition. Here, we see her political aims of freedom and justice coloring her 
suggestions, with a tinge of practicality: Jews physically require a place to rest if they are 
to achieve these ideals. In a realistic recognition of the fact that a homogenous Jewish 
state was not practical, and in fact, could provoke further conflict, Arendt’s suggestion 
that co-operation amongst Jews and Arabs was paramount makes sense. (The third and 
fourth items are more technically based instructions, again, illustrating the practical 
nature Arendt developed after years as a political journalist.) The final suggestion 
indicates Arendt’s fierce belief in grassroots, spirited participation amongst members of a 
shared community. Indeed, she suggested mixed councils. As we have seen, Arendt 
experienced first hand, in her political dealings, the power of local organizations sprung 
from a wish to improve conditions of one’s fellows.87 
                                                          
86
 Hannah Arendt. “To Save the Jewish Homeland” in The Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken Books, 
2007, 401. 
8787
 As Elizabeth Young-Bruehl writes, Arendt believed in power as manifest in “spontaneously organized, 
 45 
 In a 1940s essay called “The Political Organization of the Jewish People” Arendt 
again displayed optimism in the power of the human spirit to act spontaneously, even 
despite oneself, in political matters. The 1942 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, a months-long 
rebellion amongst concentration camp prisoners who fought against the Nazi Secret 
Service police for Arendt constituted an example of this. Unfortunately, while most Jews 
died in this uprising, they managed, with few weapons and sheer willpower, to mount a 
strong campaign. This event, Arendt wrote, occurred despite the Jews’ experience of 
going through “so many hells that no one else can still instill fear in them and who have 
been fooled so many times by vain hopes that they will not be duped by anyone else.”88 
This relatively late resistance movement represented both the alleged tendency of Jews to 
be docile and un-reactive to the Gestapo when it came to deport them, but the uprising 
also “changed the face of the Jewish people,” Arendt wrote. This was because it marked 
the last Nazi victory, as well as sparking further defensive efforts on the part of a 
previously apathetic Jewish population. 
 For Arendt, this marked a turning point in how the Jewish population’s perception 
of itself in the context of these horrific conditions. They were victims, yet despite the fact 
that most options to participate and defend oneself were eliminated, some miniscule 
possible actions existed. As she wrote, “a group of workers and intellectuals realized that 
ultimately armed resistance was the only moral and political way out.”89 Arendt further 
expanded on the constant availability of some form of action in discussing those Jews 
who were forced to betray their fellows by cooperating with the Nazis during the “Final 
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Solution.” For Arendt, the ability to act remained through the possibility of 
“nonparticipation”90. Setting aside the controversial nature of this claim as it relates to 
personal responsibility and how much choice they really had, one can see Arendt’s 
philosophy arise here: one’s humanity and dignity is always available through a careful 
consideration of the choices one has. This is clearly a theoretical and idealistic 
philosophy based on the presence of natality in human beings. This philosophy of natality 
reaches beyond individual responsibility and becomes political in that Arendt clearly 
believed that human beings should consider their actions as part of a community that 
strives for justice and freedom.  
In the specific instance of the responsibility of Jews “co-operating” with the Nazi 
regime, Arendt also pointed out that these individuals were not subject to the soul-
destroying conditions of the concentration camps. With this qualification in mind, we can 
see her philosophy on totalitarianism and humanity present: the camps destroyed all 
dignity and created a mass of human beings unable to access their ability to think and act 
and participate. Thus, she heaped more blame on those who retained a degree of freedom 
and did not access their ability to act. As she wrote, “the distinction between victims and 
persecutors was blurred in the concentration camps, deliberately and with 
calculation…”91 
In addition to the striving for the ideals of justice and freedom in a political 
community, Arendt discussed the underlying, preconceived notion of equality. Ideally, 
these ideals should apply and be available to every citizen. In the context of the time 
Arendt wrote, Jews were not equal in terms of basic civil rights. However, she did not 
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explicitly tackle the notion of equality in the Jewish Writings. The most explicit 
discussion occurs in a 1940s essay called “The Jewish War That Isn’t Happening,” in 
which she shows a strong belief in a fundamental, inalienable equality based mainly on 
the sheer biological reality that we all share a physical constitution. As she wrote, “The 
idea of a fundamental, natural inequality of peoples, which is the form that injustice has 
taken over time, can only be defeated by the idea of an original and inalienable equality 
among those who bear a human countenance.”92 
With this discussion of justice, freedom and equality in mind, one can more 
carefully attempt to derive Arendt’s political philosophy in the Jewish Writings. It is clear 
that if one exists, it is replete with contradictions. Perhaps the following quote best 
illustrates this claim: “…the role of the heart in politics seems to me altogether 
questionable…” This statement appears relatively late in the Jewish Writings in a 
response to a criticism from a peer about Eichmann in Jerusalem’s purported lack of 
compassion. Arendt stated that emotions are necessary in politics (“…there can be no 
patriotism without permanent opposition…”), and that for her personally, grief about the 
wrongs done by the Jewish people is necessary as a “motive for certain actions or 
attitudes,” emotions. However, she went on to say that “emotions are used in order to 
conceal factual truths.”93 So it is clear that Arendt exhibited ambivalence as to the role of 
emotions in politics: she was suspicious of the cold, emotionless actions of realpolitik, 
but she was also skeptical of the distorting effect that emotions and the heart play in 
politics and the public realm. 
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             Over the years as a writer for Aufbau, in this role as political agitator and thinker, 
Arendt displayed a range of opinions and urgings, from purely practical (a binational 
confederated Palestinian state); to an ambiguous admonition to Jews to pursue freedom 
and justice. She denounced realpolitik, yet accepted its ubiquity; she absolutely 
advocated to the Jewish population that it rouse itself from its apathy and maintain 
allegiance to the pursuit of freedom and justice, yet the statement above indicates the 
curious denouncement of emotion in politics. She called for the necessity of the creation 
of a Jewish “homeland”, but stopped short at a sovereign state, as that would represent a 
capitulation to the oppressive imperialist state system, which is the original responsible 
regime that cast out the Jews and rendered them homeless and thus vulnerable to its 
tyrannical whims. Indeed, Arendt wanted nothing more than for Jews to gain admittance 
to the international, political realm, become “normalized”, and become “like everyone 
else.” This is another curious contention, given the Jews’ chronic outsider status and 
claim of firsthand religious knowledge, but it illustrates, once again, Arendt’s practical 
nature. 
             She also claimed that hope and fear were, paradoxically, the very essential emotions  
that lead Jews to their deaths in the concentration camps. By retaining these all-too-
human emotions, the Jews retained the last shreds of their humanity, thus allowing 
themselves to live and persevere in the sub-human conditions, which ultimately lead 
them to die in the fashion their enemies wished. 
              So if this is true, it would seem to make some sense that Arendt dismissed the 
presence of the heart in politics. But, especially taking into account Plato’s formulation of 
the ideal ruler as a balanced combination of strength, courage and intellect, one might 
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then pose the question to her: what is the pursuit of justice and freedom without a 
conviction of one’s heart to something higher than oneself; an ideal?  How can one then 
conduct oneself in political matters without the courage gleaned from one’s heart to 
remain committed to the ultimate human aspirations of freedom and justice? Perhaps this 
curious statement illustrates the reality of the situation: in the face of such horrific and 
unthinkable de-humanization associated with totalitarian movements, the matters of the 
heart become superfluous. But the contradiction rears its head during the slow process of 
the reconstruction of the Jewish people: the heart (and its natural goals of freedom and 
justice) are essential to re-enter society, as well as essential to understanding what lead to 
such a situation and possibly allowing humanity to uphold the promise of “never again.” 
 
THE HUMAN CONDITION 
 
The thoughts come to me, 
I am no longer a stranger to them.  
I grow in them as in a place,  
As in a plowed field.94 
 
BACKGROUND 
Arendt wrote this poem upon completing the Origins of Totalitarianism. In 
addition to marking the end of this work, it represented a return to the partially written 
Human Condition. This accomplishment represented not only her turn to political 
philosophy, but also represented a turning point in her academic life in that she rejected 
the mainstream theory amongst her peers that European Enlightenment thought was an 
                                                          
94
 Young-Bruehl, (1982), 222. 
 50 
inescapable precursor to the Nazi regime95. Thus, with Origins of Totalitarianism 
completed, she marked a drastic turn from her roots, and embarked on a new project with 
the Human Condition. This book constituted her radically changed philosophical 
foundation- the “plowed field” to which she referred. 
 In order to understand the roots of the Human Condition, some brief background 
is helpful, especially as it relates to her best-known work, Origins of Totalitarianism. In 
her biography of Hannah Arendt, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl writes that the Human 
Condition was a natural response to Arendt’s critique of Marxism in Origins of 
Totalitarianism. This book also marked the beginning of Arendt’s critique of modernity 
and industrialization, and their impact on human activity. As Arendt explained in Origins 
of Totalitarianism, the modern world caused a sense of “uprootedness,” “isolation,” and 
“worldlessness”.96 Modernity and its technological advancements had rendered 
individuals superfluous, which created a thoughtless, mass society. Arendt believed that 
in this imperialistic system that relied on the nation-state as its organizing force, stateless 
Jews were naturally the victims.97 In addition to the situation at hand, The Human 
Condition picked up on this analysis of modernity by investigating Marx’ predictions as 
they related to the automation of human activity and the progression to Marx’ notion of 
the end of history, in which human beings would be freed from labor and would overturn 
traditional political structures and institutions. 
Given the ambitious goal of the Human Condition- an expansive account of 
Marx’ thought- writing it proved almost too overwhelming for Arendt. Her conception of 
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the project was a vast underestimation, and she realized that it would instead need to 
comprise an entire history of political philosophy. In her own words, Arendt compared 
her intended project to appearing before a judge after attempting a “little robbery”, 
expecting to serve couple of years in prison, but instead receiving a “prison sentence of 
God knows how long.”98 I believe the comment illustrates not only the weight of the 
ambition Arendt possessed, but her own torturous and personal struggle with reconciling 
how she understood the origins of the Holocaust. This can be explained at several levels, 
or through several aspects of her personality: as a Jew who escaped the horrific 
conditions of the concentration camps; as a member of the political and intellectual elite 
who possessed a degree of influence; as a historical Jew and the implications of the 
extent of personal and collective responsibility, and as a German female. This theory 
returns to the suggestion of Benhabib that her personal experiences played a role in her 
development as a political philosopher. 
The writing of The Human Condition was also overwhelming because Arendt 
purportedly (if not cognitively) undertook this academic enterprise at a personal level. It 
is conceivable that she felt the responsibility for the past, and her role in it, as an exiled 
German Jewess who escaped Germany. In general, one can say that the delicate exercise 
of trying to understand the past and present also automatically implicates oneself because 
such an implication supposes a degree of responsibility in that if one can presently 
understand the roots of an event, one perhaps could have recognized them at the outset 
had they been alert enough. Witness her harsh criticism in the Jewish Writings of Jews 
and their satisfaction with mere survival, with playing dead, as well as their financial role 
in society and the resulting hatred it generated in the rest of society. Recall also Arendt’s 
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comments on history and pearl-diving previously stated from her essay on Walter 
Benjamin.  
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN JEWISH WRITINGS AND HUMAN CONDITION 
Despite some commentary from Arendt herself in the Human Condition, it is still 
difficult to derive a specific formulation of a political philosophy both in this work. 
However, in the Human Condition, which this section will explore, Arendt’s political 
philosophy centers on her concept of natality and freedom. In the Jewish Writings, she 
urged a striving towards the ideals of justice and freedom for the Jewish people, who 
were locked out of the international system that granted these rights inherently through 
the state system. This section of the thesis will explore the plausibility of a political 
philosophy in both the Jewish Writings and the Human Condition, how they are linked 
and how the latter served as a basis for the Human Condition. 
In the Jewish Writings, Arendt depicted a striving for freedom and justice 
amongst the Jews that was remarkably intact, despite a crushing sense of apathy and a 
consistent unwillingness to act. This striving was defiantly based on the notion of 
equality, despite an abhorrent lack of equality the Jews experienced throughout much of 
their history. In the Jewish Writings, Arendt posited a notion of equality based on a 
biological, reductive and simplistic notion of humanity; that is, we all physically possess 
a countenance99. This is indisputable and physically grounded, as opposed to 
metaphysically grounded. So while Arendt did not claim a knowable human nature upon 
which we can ground human rights, she found an inarguable commonality within a 
plurality of human beings that can serve as a starting point for equality.  
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 This stark, non-idealistic notion of equality as the foundation for human rights in 
the Jewish Writings is in direct contrast to the idealism of the Human Condition. In this 
book, Arendt trained a thread of natality throughout work as the remedy to the events of 
the 20th Century, and the associated worldlessness and alienation of the modern world. 
But despite this display of idealism, she was quick to remind readers of the danger in 
trying to create utopian societies: they all “broke down quickly under the weight of 
reality…” she wrote,100 as a result of the uncontrollable and imperfect nature of human 
relations.  
NATALITY 
 In attempting to reconstruct Arendt’s turn to political philosophy in the Human 
Condition, I will show that she positioned natality, or new beginnings, as a metaphysical 
remedy to the events of the 20th Century she witnessed. This turn represents a somewhat 
uneasy acknowledgement of the complicated tension associated with the fact that for 
successful human affairs (with success being at the very least an avoidance of events such 
as the Holocaust) there is a necessity for the presence of both politics and philosophy, 
both thought and action and theory and practice.  
But first, in order to understand the concept of natality, one must trace back 
through Arendt’s notions of the private and public realms; work, labor, action and the vita 
activa and vita contemplativa.   
 The first step to understanding Arendt’s philosophy in the Human Condition 
requires that one proceed immediately to her concept of natality. Surprisingly, although 
natality underpins not only the Human Condition, but much of Arendt’s work, the word 
itself only appears in this book a handful of times. Natality, for Arendt, represented the 
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common denominator of human existence: “birth and death, natality and mortality.”101 At 
first glance, this appears to be yet another reductive definition, especially since Arendt 
explicitly denied a commonly identifiable human nature. So with only biological realities, 
and a lack of a knowable human nature (for Arendt, knowledge of human nature is such  
“that only a god could know and define…”102) to define man, what is the significance of 
natality, and how does it create a platform from which to launch a new type of politics, as 
Arendt called for?   
Natality, for Arendt, was not merely a biological reality that defines human 
beings. It is also a capacity that can rescue human beings from themselves and from the 
inevitable and egregious behavior they will engage in. As she wrote, it is a “miracle that 
saves the world, the realm of human affairs.” To be specific, natality saves the world by 
allowing human beings, through their birth and appearance to fellow human beings, to 
act. This can “bestow upon human affairs faith and hope…”103 In a footnote, Arendt 
explained this hope and faith as not being exclusively divine; she believed human faith is 
powerful enough to realize miracles. But the ability to act anew (natality) is a 
prerequisite, she stated. 
Another definitive quality of natality is that it alerts us to the fact that we are 
subject to time, to past and future moments. Natality supposes that although human 
beings live in the gap of the present moment,104 through thought, they can always access 
the past and future moments surrounding them. It is at this point of Arendt’s formulation 
of natality and human relations that she became more complex in terms of explaining a 
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possible political philosophy. Natality gives birth to action and speech, the uniquely 
human capacity for appearing in the world that can produce a miracle. In light of the 
reality that man lives in the gap of the present, he is unable to additionally live in the past 
or the future moments. As a result, he is unable to travel to past moments in which he 
made mistakes, nor can he assure the outcome of his actions in the future. Clearly, this 
can be problematic in a society in which a plurality of individuals are competing with one 
another for scarce resources, and to secure an infinite number of desired outcomes. 
Collisions, intrusions and conflict are inevitable. But Arendt saw a uniquely human 
remedy to a world in which action is essential but wildly unpredictable in terms of 
results. As she wrote: “The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the 
outcome and end of any action is simply that action has no end. The process of a single 
deed can quite literally endure throughout time until mankind itself has come to an end.” 
Furthermore, we are all subject to biological necessity in that we are all living 
beings attempting to continue to do so. As a result of this ongoing biological drive to 
continue the lives of oneself and one’s surrounding community, there exists a common 
human experience of plurality. For Arendt, plurality was the “condition of human action 
because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as 
anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.”105 The plurality that defines the Human 
Condition also encompasses the reality that we are conditioned by the unavoidable 
contact with one another.106 This plurality is a result of the fact that we see one another 
only from our own vantage point. “Being seen and heard by others derive their 
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significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position.”107 
 So while we share the experience that we are unique and cannot be reproduced, 
biology levels us with its unavoidable boundary of life (new beginnings) and death 
(ending). Further to this, biology dictates that we must participate in certain activities as 
we aim at securing the continuation of our existence. Arendt described these activities as 
action, labor and work. Labor is defined as “the activity which corresponds to the 
biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism and 
eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by 
labor.” Work is “the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, 
which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by the species’ ever-
recurring life cycle. Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of things…” and is also the 
activity which ties human beings to the world. In other words, it creates the human 
condition of worldliness. Action is a higher endeavor, as it “engages in founding and 
preserving political bodies, creates the conditions for remembrance, that is, for history.” 
It corresponds to the human condition of plurality, and occurs between human beings free 
of the “intermediary of things or matter.”108 
 The significance of these terms, especially for the purposes of this thesis, is 
twofold. First, these terms are unique to Arendt and define not only the words she chose 
to use to describe the experiences of the human condition, but also set her apart in the 
way in which she regarded politics. In order to understand Arendt, one must first 
understand these terms, which also pave the way for understanding the ways in which 
Arendt categorized human relations (the public and private realms, which will be 
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discussed shortly). Second, these terms appear late in Arendt’s life work, which marks 
her turn to a re-examined and re-defined political philosophy. By seeking to categorize 
and explain human relations, Arendt was implicitly and concurrently admitting the 
existence of the possibility of a knowable human nature. Even though Arendt denied its 
knowability, I argue that this human nature is the quality of natality, the capacity for new 
beginnings, which ideally demands of one a minimum of thought before action. We can 
now turn to Arendt’s explanations of the public and private realms, the venue in which 
action occurs. 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
 First, it is helpful to include a definition of political action that appears in a 
collection of essays called Between Past and Future. In an essay called “What is 
Freedom?”109 Arendt wrote that the public realm guarantees freedom by preserving the 
space in which it can appear. This conception of the public realm as guarantor of freedom 
mirrors the duality that is first played out in an individual: man is free within himself to 
engage in thought and dialogue; he becomes human through speech in that he articulates 
his thoughts and feelings, after they have been acknowledged and processed internally. 
For Arendt, this was the ultimate political experience; man is seen and heard and makes 
himself known. Without this experience, we are animals, or worse, we become victims of 
a totalitarian regime where we have lost the ability to act and speak.110  
 This notion of the public and private realms, for Arendt, grew from her extensive 
studies on the Greek and Roman regimes In the Greek public realm represented the only 
venue where one could show himself and engage in action.. In modern political 
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configurations, society- or the social- became publicized in the modern world, and “mass 
society” replaced the family as the definitive unit. Conversely, in the ancient world, the 
private sphere remained sheltered, as it was home to the violence associated with the life 
cycle: procreation and death itself. As Arendt wrote, women and slaves were confined to 
the private realm, as they were stewards of the “necessities of life.”111 
These notions of the public and private realms precede Arendt’s conception of the 
common good. In order to preserve this common world, it was for Arendt absolutely 
essential to maintain a space in which men and women can express themselves. If not, 
this suppression constitutes the seeds of a totalitarian regime, where people’s freedom of 
expression is squeezed so much that individuals are rendered as mere formless parts of a 
mass society. This, in turn, abolishes courage, which perpetuates the oppression inherent 
in a totalitarian regime.112 
The common world, for Arendt, was the space in which members of a society 
regard one another, and if done properly, preserve it and encourage the plurality that is 
inherent in the human condition113. In this common world, regardless of social stature, 
people fixate on a common object. If not, this is what leads to tyrannies, Arendt wrote. 
“The human sense of reality demands that men actualize the sheer passive givenness of 
their being, not in order to change it but in order to make articulate and call into full 
existence what otherwise they would have to suffer passively anyhow.”114 
The emphasis on the public realm is understandable, especially when examined in 
light of the politics presented in the Jewish Writings. As just previously established, 
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Arendt traced the roots of totalitarianism back to the loss of the public realm. Preceding 
this loss, however, is the creation of a mass society in which the individual becomes 
extremely isolated and therefore lacks normal social relationships.115 It is conceivable 
that in this atmosphere of mass society and radical isolation, the public realm loses its 
meaning and individual speech and action falls on deaf ears as every member of society 
is living in his or her own bubble. This radical isolation leads to a mass subscription to 
the ideologies presented by those in power. “While isolation concerns only the political 
realm of life, loneliness concerns human life as a whole. Totalitarian governments, like 
all tyrannies, certainly could not exist without destroy public realm of life, that is, without 
destroying, by isolating men, their political capacities.”116 
THE JEWISH PUBLIC REALM: KIBBUTZES AND SALONS 
Part of the problem in terms of the treatment of Jews, as Arendt explained it, was 
that they never gained entry to the public realm. It is enlightening, on this matter, to note 
Arendt’s portrayal of a group of wealthy Berlin Jewesses reacted to this oppressive pariah 
status by creating their own sort of public realm in the salons of the late 18th Century. 
Arendt revealed her affinity for such a phenomenon in her biography of Rachel 
Varnhagen, writes Seyla Benhabib. They encouraged a social sphere (albeit isolated from 
the greater public realm and not marked by the agonism of the Greek polis) civic 
friendships in which women specifically could engage in speech and action and were 
guaranteed equality.117 For Arendt, this represented a quintessential political action.  
In addition to the salons, we can again see Arendt’s belief in a healthy public 
realm in her description of the kibbutz movement (she called it the most promising of all 
                                                          
115
 Arendt (1955), 317. 
116
 Ibid, 475. 
117
 Benhabib 17. 
 60 
social experiments made in the 20th Century, as well as the most magnificent part of the 
Jewish homeland) in the Jewish Writings as another ideal political action. This is curious, 
since in isolation, the kibbutz movement constituted a spontaneous political community 
with relative equality and opportunity to express oneself, however, the kibbutz residents 
lived apart from the rest of the community. In fact, their very rejection from mainstream 
society was the reason for their retreat. Nevertheless, Arendt discussed the kibbutzes and 
their “complete freedom”118 fondly, and thus indicated her affinity for these “new type of 
Jews” who were “too decent for politics.”119 These Jews represented a “new type of 
man,” and as a result of their retreat to the “moon”, established new social ideals, and 
encouraged social justice with “newly established values: their genuine contempt for 
material wealth, exploitation and bourgeois life; their unique combination of culture and 
labor; their rigorous realization of social justice within their small circle; and their loving 
pride in the fertile soil, the work of their hands, together with an utter and surprising lack 
of any wish for personal possessions.” 
The drawback, of course, to this isolation is a complete lack of political influence; 
ironically the very problem plaguing the Jews Arendt identified originally. These Jews 
were willing to trade participation in mainstream politics for peace to pursue their own 
goals in the manner they wished. The loss of the kibbutzes, Arendt wrote, would be “one 
of the severest blows to the hopes of all those” people who were cast out from society 
and were unable to make peace with their neighbors, she wrote.120  It should be noted that 
this discussion of kibbutzes was written relatively early in Arendt’s political writings; in 
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the 1940s. She did not apparently write extensively on them again, so one can assume 
that her opinion must have changed, but the point can be witnessed in her attitude 
towards self-expression and the public realm. It also illustrates a tension in Arendt’s 
thought in that her own optimism stemmed from self-expression amongst the Jewish 
people solely in an isolated community that started anew, not in the realities of the time. 
One could then ask her if she truly believed integration was possible, or did she believe 
that it was futile and that Jews must begin anew in a community isolated from the rest of 
society. 
Nevertheless, in terms of politics in general, Arendt believed that the 
commonality of the public realm is a fragile defense against tyranny. Natality was 
continually christened here, and exhibited the most human capacity: to begin anew, as 
well as to live and die. In Between Past and Future, Arendt described natality as the 
event of “human beings being born anew.”121 In the Human Condition, Arendt went 
further in linking this metaphysical phenomenon to politics in that she described natality 
as a “miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs…it is in other words, the 
birth of new men and the new beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue of being 
born. Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow upon human affairs faith and 
hope, those two essential characteristics of human existence, which Greek antiquity 
ignored altogether, discounting the keeping of faith as a very uncommon and not too 
important virtue and counting hope among the evils of illusions in Pandora’s box.”122 It 
should be noted that in Between Past and Future, Arendt acknowledged the peril in 
imbuing natality with such weigh when she wrote that “…no single act, and no single 
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event, can ever, once and for all, deliver and save a man, a nation, or mankind.”123 Thus 
we can see Arendt’s urgent call for natality to be continually accessed. 
SPEECH AND ACTION; LABOUR AND WORK 
In terms of human potential, natality is expressed through speech and action, 
which Arendt called the “articulation of natality.”124 Action and speech are the capacities 
that heighten the human existence from simply biological beings subjected to life and 
death, to thinking and feeling beings that are able to intervene in this life and death cycle 
with intentions and aspirations.  
In addressing the phenomenon of natality, it is important to acknowledge a 
peculiarity related to Arendt’s denial of a knowable human nature. Arendt specifically 
denied a human nature, and instead posits a human condition, but in the book the Human 
Condition, Arendt made a relatively close approach to defining human nature when she 
addressed action and speech. These capacities, she wrote, raise human beings above 
animals, but human beings are still limited by the unavoidable biological reality of death. 
As she wrote, human affairs governed solely by this reality of fatality are doomed. In 
order for human affairs to shirk this impending doom and rise above it, the “faculty of 
action” is a necessary miracle that allows man to “begin something anew.”125  
The human condition is also unavoidably defined by, and grounded by, the pain 
and effort inherent in existing in the world. This reality leads man to seek transcendence 
from these burdens, which can both alienate him, but can also create feelings of “vitality 
and liveliness” if he is able to shoulder this “burden,” and “toil and trouble of life.” So 
such is another quality Arendt assigned to man, which verges on a component of human 
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nature: he is able to overcome biological burdens, at least temporarily, through sheer 
willpower. And while willpower is not exclusive to man (animals surely exhibit will), it 
is the creativity of expression associated with plurality through action that raises him 
above the animal kingdom.  
In further exploring action, it is useful to explore Arendt’s definition of the 
associated human capacities of labor and work. The discussion of labor and work centers 
on Arendt’s self-admittedly unorthodox distinction between the two. This was in 
comparison to the ancient distinction between craftsmanship and manual labor that 
tended to only biological necessities.126 To further refine the distinction, Arendt 
differentiated between productive and unproductive labor. First though, the definition of 
labor was for Arendt that it “leaves nothing behind, that the result of its effort is almost as 
quickly consumed as the effort is spent.”127 Engaged in this urgent effort is the animal 
laborans (“a worldless” creature “driven by his body”), as opposed to the homo faber, 
who is engaged in work.128 The animal laborans can be granted freedom only through 
producing something as a result of his or her labor. This capacity “for making, fabricating 
and producing…eases the pain and trouble of laboring, but also erects a world of 
durability,” Arendt wrote.129  
The products of work are uniquely human, and “guarantee the permanence and 
durability without which a world would not be possible at all.” The products, therefore, 
of work, are derived from the human capacity for action and speech, and “constitute the 
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fabric of human relationships and affairs.”130 These are unique, diverse, and infinite, and 
they are products of action and speech generated by the human condition of plurality; and 
man’s capacity for new beginnings. 
FORGIVENESS AND PROMISES AS REMEDY 
Action-and the inherent plurality of the world- are also fraught with peril because 
it presupposes freedom to start anew, which can generate unwanted results, ie conflict 
with one another, or the trading off of one’s freedom to avoid such conflict. As a result, 
action means constant “trespassing” upon one another, or in Arendt’s words, “constant 
establishment of new relations within a web of relations.”131 Indeed, Arendt suggested 
that modern notions of freedom mean that no man can ever be sovereign, as the human 
condition of living in the world is living in a plurality. So in addition to the formulation 
of forgiveness and promises that will be discussed shortly, Arendt suggested that one can 
maintain one’s sovereignty by abstaining from participating in human affairs.132 But 
obviously, this is neither realistic, nor desirable, so Arendt proceeded to discuss 
forgiveness and promises as possible salves to such friction. 
Forgiveness evokes the past moments in which action was realized. Action, in this 
light, is irreversible, as Arendt said. In the context of the discussion of work and labor, in 
which man receives redemption through producing a useful product, or through speech 
and action, forgiveness centers on the “potentiality” of action.133 This redemptive quality 
of forgiveness does not flow from a divine source, but rather, from the very source from 
which the inherent irreversibility and unpredictability originate. As Arendt wrote, “The 
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remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the 
faculty to make and keep promises. The two faculties belong together in so far as one of 
them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, whose ‘sins’ hang like Democles’ 
sword over every new generation; and the other binding oneself through promises, serves 
to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security 
without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in 
the relationships between men.” 
Therefore, forgiveness frees man from the past and allows one to escape eternal 
condemnation to one act. Promises, then, grant identity by tying one to the future. 
Promises rescue man, both individually and socially, from the “darkness of the human 
heart” and its unpredictability in terms of how fellow human beings will react.134 Natality 
hides here as the foundation, as a tacit acknowledgement of the eternal capacity to begin 
anew, which grants man the capacity to promise. Forgiveness and promises are also 
responses to necessity; they imply that human beings can counter necessity by reacting 
and overcoming the endless cycle of becoming.135  
However, Arendt revealed a previously held lack of faith in politics in the Jewish 
Writings when she indicated that political contracts and treaties (while specific 
acknowledgements of the past and future) ignore the unpredictability and unreliability of 
human conduct. As a result, they “lose their binding power and the whole enterprise 
becomes self-defeating.” Arendt’s discussion of political promises prompts a reflection 
on the portion of Jewish Writings that addresses the potential of the spirit of a community 
and spontaneous action. She wrote that when people gather together and “act in concert,” 
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they preserve public space with the “force of mutual promise or contract.” This can grant 
a measure of sovereignty to a people, even those who are not completely free, she wrote. 
This is because sovereignty, in that it ignores plurality, is a spurious or false claim for 
Arendt. If we translate this to analyze the Jewish Writings, we can see that Arendt viewed 
the Jews as having complete freedom since they were stateless, and thus unbound from a 
specific state’s rules.  
This modern configuration, in which human relations are subject to a sort of code 
of conduct, are actually devoid of any traditional foundation, be it divine or metaphysical. 
Instead, Arendt remained true to her formulation of natality and its inherent plurality as 
the basis for guiding human relations. As a result, forgiving and promising play a major 
role in politics by establishing a “diametrically different set of guiding principles from 
the most ‘moral’ standards inherent in the notion of Platonic rule.”136 Platonic rule, for 
Arendt, meant a society governed primarily by adherence to right and wrong as dictated 
by one’s relationship with oneself, which was translated to the public realm as “man writ 
large”. In other words, men endeavoring to achieve a healthy soul would encourage a 
healthy city.137 
In contrast, this Kantian (and strictly secular, she was quick to clarify) “moral 
code,” Arendt wrote, is based on respecting the plurality of society. It is a recognition of 
an individual’s capacity to act and speak in the context of a society, therefore “the extent 
and modes of being forgiven and being promised determine the extent and modes in 
which one may be able to forgive himself or keep promises concerned only with 
himself.” For Arendt, morality is a construct of tradition, and arises out of a natural 
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human desire to speak and act, to appear and recognize one another.  
In light of the Jewish Writings, in which Arendt addressed seemingly 
unforgiveable trespasses against millions of human beings, her discussion in the Human 
Condition of forgiveness becomes even more salient and revealing. Vengeance and 
revenge, although natural human responses, traps man in the past by tying him to the 
original transgression- “…everybody remains bound to the process…” she wrote.138 This 
is why forgiveness frees man, and we can see here the underpinning of natality, since 
forgiveness is “unexpected…unpredictable and unconditioned by the act” and therefore 
“acts anew.” 
 It follows that punishment is an alternative to forgiveness, but this is insufficient 
for achieving or maintaining an element of freedom, Arendt believed. This is because, 
again, punishment would tie man to the act, especially in the case of Kant’s “radical 
evil.” This type of evil is unforgiveable, therefore un-punishable, so resides outside of the 
realm of human affairs. It is at this point that Arendt evoked Jesus’ formulation of 
forgiving the person (the who and what they perpetrated) through respect.139 This respect 
is gleaned from acknowledging the public space between one another. It should be noted 
that Arendt mourned a lack of common respect, and asserted that the modern world 
granted it only to those society deemed worthy of respect or esteem. 
ANALYSIS 
 Up to this point, I have attempted to reconstruct Arendt’s political philosophy as 
exhibited in the Human Condition. It is a political philosophy that aims at the ideal of 
preserving natality as that which can constantly recreate freedom through speech and 
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action in the public realm. In contrast, the Jewish Writings serves as a real-world example 
of what occurs when people are not able or willing to exercise their ability to act in the 
public sphere. Their freedom, or to use the terminology of the Human Condition, their 
natality, is effectively quashed. Jewish Writings was written by the political journalist 
Arendt, as opposed to the political philosopher Arendt who wrote the Human Condition. 
Jewish Writings outlines Arendt’s speculation on why the Jewish people of Europe met 
the fate they did. Perhaps consequently, she turned to metaphysics to try to piece together 
both an explanation in the Human Condition and subtle prescriptive suggestions aimed at 
preventing not only the dehumanization and mass executions of the Holocaust, but 
another totalitarian regime from taking power.   
 At this point, I will further unpack the philosophical thought that is both apparent, 
and not so apparent, in the Jewish Writings and how it appears in the Human Condition. I 
have determined that there are two categories in which philosophical discussion can be 
rooted out in the Jewish Writings: ideals (freedom and justice) and politics (spontaneous 
actions such as the kibbutzes and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; and goals such as the 
normalization of Jewish politics). While Arendt maintained an action-oriented approach 
to discussing these matters in the Jewish Writings, some philosophy seeps through, which 
is an even more illuminating means of determining her political philosophy in this work 
and how it traces through to the Human Condition. 
 As Arendt indicated in the Jewish Writings, freedom and justice are the ideals at 
which all humans, especially the Jews, should aim. This is a sweeping statement, to be 
sure, but one can see more explicitly what Arendt meant by this in the Human Condition. 
Freedom is man’s realized ability to begin anew, specifically to act and speak in the 
 69 
public realm. It is also man’s emancipation from necessity. But in light of the Jewish 
Writings, perhaps Arendt’s most revealing comments on freedom appear at the end of the 
Human Condition. Political freedom is necessary to encourage thought, which she called 
the most vulnerable of human capacities. Remaining faithful to her notion of plurality 
informing the Human Condition of politics, she said that thought is available to everyone, 
and original, action without thought is most likely in a tyranny.140   
So it is possible to trace the ambiguous notion of freedom in the Jewish Writings 
to a more sculpted and developed notion of freedom in the Human Condition, which is 
natality. For Arendt, witnessing the slow and gradual dissolution of freedom that 
culminated in the Holocaust formed for her the notion of natality. At its core, natality 
manifests itself in two fashions: first, the individual experience of exercising one’s 
freedom to act and speak, which is to show oneself to one’s fellow human beings. The 
second aspect, then, addresses the plurality of the Human Condition, which Arendt 
defined as the political and social realms.   
The failure to express oneself in public spaces results in the tyranny of exclusion 
from the plurality of the Human Condition, and the formation of a dehumanized mass of 
people. As Arendt wrote in Origins of Totalitarianism:   “The fundamental deprivation of 
human rights is manifested first and foremost and above all in the deprivation of a place 
in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.”141 
            In contemplating Arendt’s emphasis on freedom as exhibited in natality, some 
major questions are raised that speak to the seemingly unavoidable paradoxes and 
contradictions raised early in this thesis, and in politics and human relations as a whole. 
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These questions relate to thought and action, and thus, politics and philosophy. Arendt 
repeatedly urged people to think what they are doing.142 This statement is so simple that it 
immediately prompts curiosity. Why should we think what we are doing? For how long? 
For every action? With who and what in mind? To what end? This last question is 
perhaps the most salient. What end does Arendt have in mind when she insisted that one 
think what they are doing? Does she indeed prescribe thoughtful action with an end in 
mind? I suspect she doesn’t, as she is loathe to conflate means with ends in politics and 
action. However, a rigorous demand to consistently think what one is doing in itself 
points to an ideal: consistently thoughtful action.  
               This seems problematic on several levels: this is not practical, and seems to be 
potentially paralyzing; part of the Human Condition (natality) is inherently biological (we 
are physical beings, teleologically aimed at survival), therefore we are ruled by instinct 
and cannot consistently avoid action that is not spontaneous and condition by instinct; 
equality (of mental and physical ability) is not part of the Human Condition, and as a 
result, we are not all capable of consistent, thoughtful action. However, I would argue 
that this is beside the point; the philosophy undergirding Arendt’s insistence on 
thoughtful action is merely an ideal. This is the point, though, in addressing the paradox 
of Arendt’s urgings: to ask that thought consistently precede action is a tall order.  
               She heightened this tall order by calling for this thought to be unaccompanied 
by tradition. She urged us to “think without banisters.”143 But one can then ask: how do 
we shirk tradition and authority? How do we not meet ourselves and our predecessors 
when we engage in thoughts that are affected by our surroundings and the information we 
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receive? Is this even possible, and is it necessary every time one goes to act? Isn’t an 
insistence on the necessity of thought an ideal, or an end in itself, with thought being the 
means? Has Arendt not conflated thought and action herself? I believe she rescues this 
formulation with natality-man’s eternal ability to begin anew. But herein lies more 
contradiction and paradox. Natality presupposes unpredictability, and therefore, danger. 
It is a risky enterprise every time a human being acts, as in a plurality one can never 
predict how one’s fellows will react. To this end, Arendt spent much time on forgiveness 
and promises as antidotes to the messy reality of plurality and its potentially corrosive 
effect on human relations.  
              This plurality and constant chaos of colliding opinions and wills is the reason 
human beings established political institutions and regimes. In the Jewish Writings, 
Arendt showed a hostile, yet justified distaste for these political institutions, which 
clearly failed humanity. However, she does not completely renounce the human capacity 
to engage with one another peacefully, and even hopefully. Witness her inclusion of the 
concepts of freedom and justice appear as ideals at which human beings should aim in the 
Jewish Writings, albeit they are loosely defined.  
            At this point, in order to get a grip on the political philosophy Arendt crafted, it is 
helpful to turn to a discussion of action in the Human Condition. But in turning to this 
discussion, which does draw out these concepts more, we can see why Arendt was so 
reluctant to first define a human nature, and second to lay a foundation on which human 
nature can seek to improve itself as a collective. To explain this reluctance, Arendt turned 
to the ancients and their conflation of making and doing in the political realm. For 
Arendt, when the ancient primacy of contemplation of an ideal was carried over into 
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politics in the modern age, this conflated means and ends. This is dangerous (in fact, it 
results in “murderous consequences”144) because then all means are permissible if they 
are efficient, she wrote. But escaping the discussion of means without referring to ends is 
a paradox; an impossibility, she added, which indicates “perplexities.” The point, for 
Arendt, is that someone will always regard politics in terms of means and ends, and that 
this inevitably leads to tyranny and dangerous outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
             In this section on the Human Condition and the Jewish Writings, I have tried to 
link them together in terms of a political philosophy, and I have tried to illustrate her 
transition from political journalist to political philosopher. I have tried to argue that 
Arendt’s transition ultimately shows her belief in a fundamental necessity for human 
beings to strive for ideals, especially times of political crisis, but that the capacity of 
human beings to act anew takes precedence over this striving for ideals. As I have tried to 
show, if human beings fail to act, their natality is lost (although not permanently), and 
thus freedom is gradually eroded. Freedom and justice are natural outcomes of natality, if 
it is maintained in both the public and private realms in the form of expression and 
appearance through speech and action.  
               I also have attempted to show that Arendt’s natality illustrates the tension 
between politics and philosophy and thought and action: in order to maintain natality 
(freedom), one ideally preludes action with thought. This tension exists because this is an 
ideal, it is not always possible, but it is always available, thus creating a demand on 
human beings to achieve a balance in response to this tension. One cannot always think 
before one acts, nor is this always necessary, but as a human being, one always has action 
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free of thought available to him or her.  
             By its very essence, natality can never be obliterated as a human capacity, but it 
can be discouraged in the public realm to the point that individuality gradually 
disappears. One of the worst consequences of this was the concentration camps. 
Therefore, as a remedy to a society in which natality cannot be exercised publicly, Arendt 
constructed an answer to the horrific results of the treatment of Jews in particular, and in 
general, to return and redefine the concept of freedom to a society overturned by 
unthinkable events. This society had created a new type of human being and new types of 
tyrannical leaders, which stripped away basic dignity. Thus, for Arendt, it was necessary 
to start anew.  
             For while hope was, for the most part, lost, the ability to begin anew never 
disappeared. Even in the concentration camps, a shred of dignity remained among a 
group of prisoners who accessed their ability to start anew and challenge those who 
attempted to eliminate their humanity. Arendt also saw natality in the kibbutz movements 
and the salons as previously described in the Jewish Writings.  
              Given her insistence on starting anew, and her rejection of the status quo, one 
could question whether a blank slate for society would be appropriate. After all, if one is 
careening down a staircase with no banisters, one is likely to at least stumble, if not fall 
off altogether. This is indeed a danger that a lack of banisters, or tradition, or the structure 
of traditional politics as a safeguard of freedom, could lead to the chaos of a return to 
nature, or a free-for-all in which man attempts to survive at all costs. This could indeed 
prove to be murderous mayhem, but from Arendt’s point of view, it appears she saw no 
worse alternative than the society that produced the concentration camps. She demanded 
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a fresh start grounded on natality and thoughtful action, which she believed would pre-
suppose freedom and justice. 
            In addition to situating natality as a remedy to a loss of freedom and justice, 
Arendt addressed the absolute failure of politics to protect these ideals of a modern 
society. Arendt’s rejection of tradition as a guide for thought is evident in her lack of 
faith in modern politics, as well as her stubborn dismissal of the existence of a human 
nature. If no identifiable human nature exists, politics for human beings as a plurality is 
hopeless. However, her notion of natality circumvents this problem by grounding human 
relations in something universal, undeniable and eternal, which is as close to declaring a 
knowable human nature as she gets.  
           Considering Arendt’s personal experiences, her loss of hope and faith in politics, 
and rejection of tradition make sense. However, she in fact experienced an almost 
complete reversal in that she returned to ideals, and a metaphysical remedy to the horrific 
events she witnessed. Arendt appeared to appeal to ideals and found in humanity a seed 
of commonality-natality- within the chaotic plurality that could ground man and start 
anew.  This appeal to ideals, however, is tempered by her insistence on the maintenance 
of action to “save” the world, thus illustrating the tension between thought and action and 
politics and philosophy. 
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